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Current tort law contains incentives to target individuals and 
communities based on race and gender. Surprisingly, the basis for 
such targeting is the seemingly neutral use of three different race- and 
gender-based statistical tables (for wages, life expectancy, and 
worklife expectancy) which, when used in tort damage calculations, 
result in a great disparity between damages awarded to whites versus 
blacks and men versus women. Thus, tort law’s remedial damage 
scheme perpetuates existing racial and gender inequalities by 
compensating individuals (especially children) based on their race 
and gender. Even worse, tort law creates ex ante incentives for 
potential tortfeasors to engage in future discriminatory targeting of 
women and minorities. We provide the first full account of courts’
existing discriminatory practices. We then address the deficiencies in 
the nonblended tables that courts use (tables that use race and gender 
as discriminating factors) and the reasons behind their continued use. 
We show how the various theories of tort law (corrective justice, 
distributive justice, and economic efficiency) have contributed to a 
misunderstanding of the proper damages calculation and illustrate 
how the very same theories can be used to engender a change in the 
current praxis. We then challenge the conventional wisdom that the 
use of race- and gender-based tables is justified on efficiency grounds, 
noting fatal flaws inherent in the tables, in how they are used in courts 
to calculate damages for individuals, and in the incentives they create. 
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We reveal that similar discriminatory practices ironically exist in 
federal law, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, and even Title VII—whose goal is to 
combat gender and race discrimination. Finally, we propose a 
feasible, low-cost, logical solution that pushes toward a more efficient 
and less discriminatory tort law remedial system: courts should 
immediately terminate their use of nonblended tables. 
If the injured child were born to a mixed couple but looks black, like Barack 
Obama, I would use black tables [in the calculation of damages I present to
the jury]. However, if he is educated, and his life style is similar to the 
average typical white, then I would be inclined to use white tables. It is all a 
matter of common sense.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a high-level manager at PhedEx, a courier service. The 
company has more than 30,000 motorized vehicles traveling across the United 
States every day. On average, it experiences three accidents per day and 
fatalities or injuries every two and a half days; lots of harm can be done, and 
therefore, lots of money is on the line.2 All else being equal, you might act 
                                                                                                                     
2 See Safety Measurement System: FedEx Ground Package System Inc, FED. MOTOR 
CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SMS/Carrier/265752/Overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LQ2Y-HMNY] (last updated Jan. 1, 2017); see also Kim Briggeman, 
Concerns Raised over Increase in Trucking-Related Crash Deaths, MISSOULIAN (Dec. 18, 
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economically rationally, and probably legally, if you make sure to send your 
trucks through predominantly nonwhite population centers. We will now 
explain why this is so.
The fact that courts presumably apply the same standard of care across all 
neighborhoods regardless of the racial or socioeconomic composition of their 
residents might promote the misconception that race and gender do not matter. 
That, of course, is a mistake: race and gender in fact play a crucial role in the 
calculation of damages, and therefore in potential tortfeasors’ precautionary 
decisions.3 Tort law’s compensation scheme is conventionally understood as 
intended to restore victims to their preaccident status (to the extent possible).4
Since blacks and women in the United States earn less than whites and men, 
respectively, the damages black women receive for future losses caused by 
bodily injury or wrongful death are lower than the damages their white male 
counterparts would receive.5 The disadvantage blacks and women suffer in the 
United States, in terms of their job market prospects,6 are reflected in the level 
of tort damages they receive. 
The conclusion is unavoidable: it is less costly for courier companies to 
have accidents involving blacks (especially females) than whites (especially 
males). This distorted approach to compensation will have two effects in the 
case we are examining here: on PhedEx’s care level and on its activity level.7
First, PhedEx will decide to drive more slowly in white neighborhoods, since 
white neighborhoods generally have higher average incomes than black 
neighborhoods do.8 And, as PhedEx’s expected liability increases, so too does 




3 See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and 
Remedies, 1865–2007, 27 REV. LITIG. 37, 61 (2007).
4 Livingstone v. Raywards Coal Co. (1880) SC (HL) 25, 39 (Scot.) (“I do not think 
there is any difference of opinion as to its being a general rule that, where any injury is to 
be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be given for reparation of 
damages you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party 
who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if 
he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or 
reparation.”).
5 See infra Part II.A.2–.3.
6 Life span and worklife expectancy also factor into damage calculations and 
contribute to inequality within tort law damage calculations. See infra Part II.A.1–.2. These 
factors will be discussed in detail. 
7 See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5 (First Harvard 
Univ. Press paperback ed. 2007) (1987).
8 In the environmental context, “NIMBYism [(Not-in-my-back-yard)] in more 
affluent, white communities . . . resulted in industry taking the ‘path of least resistance,’
and targeting communities with fewer resources and political clout as the sites for new 
hazardous waste facilities . . . . These communities are where the poor and people of color 
live.” Paul Mohai & Robin Saha, Which Came First, People or Pollution? Assessing the 
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its level of optimal precaution (recall the Learned Hand Formula).9 The 
striking effect is that PhedEx will apply a very different standard of care when 
it deals with white neighborhoods than when it deals with black ones, even 
though courts do not. Second, these perverse incentives will affect PhedEx’s
activity level. Because driving slowly costs more in terms of added delivery 
time, PhedEx rationally might decide to reroute through black neighborhoods, 
where its drivers face less liability costs associated with driving faster. This is 
the distortion in activity level. 
The bottom line is that PhedEx is incentivized to send more of its vehicles 
driving speedily through black neighborhoods, endangering the people who 
live there.
To understand this point better, let us look deeper into how tort law 
calculates damages. In the dark past, judges made “intuitive” judgments about 
damage awards, which “allow[ed] race and racism to have tremendous 
influence in ways that are nearly impossible to prove.”10 Today, the damage 
calculation process is more methodical, perhaps even “scientific.”11 Yet race 
and gender still exert an enormous influence on monetary remedies, albeit now
a structural one.12 Here is why: the plaintiff in bodily injury or wrongful death 
cases is usually eligible—upon proving the defendant’s liability—for 
economic and noneconomic damages attributable to past and future harm.13
Economic damages comprise past and future losses attributable to medical 
costs and loss of income.14 Courts use three major types of government-
generated statistical tables to form the basis of these calculations.15 Life 
expectancy tables are used to determine statistical life expectancy, which 
comprises an important factor in determining the life span multiplier in future 
                                                                                                                     
Disparate Siting and Post-Siting Demographic Change Hypotheses of Environmental 
Injustice, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Nov. 2015, at 1, 16.
9 The Learned Hand formula suggests that optimal precautions should be up to the 
expected liability of the actor. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947).
10 Wriggins, supra note 3, at 56 (discussing In re Clyde S.S. Co. (The Saginaw & The 
Hamilton), 139 F. 906, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1905)). In The Saginaw & The Hamilton, the court 
evaluated damage awards for two “white” decedents and six “colored” decedents, who died 
when two ships—the Saginaw and the Hamilton—crashed off the coast of Delaware. The 
Saginaw & The Hamilton, 139 F. at 910. After discussing the categorically shorter life 
expectancy of “colored” persons as compared to “white” persons, the judge embarked on 
individualized damages assessments for each of the decedents. Id. at 914–16. Ultimately, 
he chose to lower the awards of the white decedents for reasons directly related to the 
effects of old age and physical impairment on earning capacity, while he chose to lower the 
awards of the black decedents for reasons related to the extent of their families’ reliance on 
their incomes. Id.
11 See infra notes 31–35 and accompanying text (describing how forensic economists 
calculate damages in modern tort cases).
12 See Wriggins, supra note 3, at 61.
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
14 Id.
15 See infra Part II. 
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noneconomic damages and future medical costs.16 Worklife expectancy tables
are used to determine statistical worklife expectancy (the number of years 
remaining before the victim would normally leave the work force), which is a 
pivotal issue in determining the remaining worklife multiplier in damages for 
future loss of earning capacity.17 In some cases—especially those in which 
plaintiffs do not have an established earnings record—courts also use average 
wage tables as the annual income multiplier in future loss of earning capacity 
damages.18
Problematically, life expectancy and worklife expectancy tables often 
delineate on racial lines, and all three types of tables delineate on gender 
lines.19 We call them “nonblended” tables, as they do not blend the statistics of 
men and women, or of blacks and whites. Traditionally, courts have accepted 
as evidence life expectancy, worklife expectancy, and average income values 
particularized to the plaintiff’s gender and, where available, race.20
Nonblended tables are seen as technical and objective tools to manifest 
fundamental tort law concepts: that the defendant “takes the victim as he finds 
her,” or that the goal of the damage award is to “make the plaintiff whole” and 
to “put the plaintiff back in the position she was in before the negligent act.”
Therefore, is it not part of tort law structure—and even logic—that a black 
woman should be made whole in accordance with her lower life span, fewer 
working years, and lower wage, as compared with a white man? 
In this Article we argue that this logic is deeply flawed, as not only does 
tort law’s remedial damage scheme perpetuate existing racial and gender 
                                                                                                                     
16 See infra Part II.A.1. The Restatement (Second) addresses the use of life 
expectancy tables and other evidence (possibly other statistical tables) in calculating 
damages for “harm to the person” in the comment discussing “[t]he determination of 
length of life” by stating:
In the case of permanent injuries or injuries causing death, it is necessary, in order to 
ascertain the damages, to determine the expectancy of the injured person’s life at the 
time of the tort. For this purpose it is permissible to use mortality tables and other 
evidence as to the average expectancy of a large number of persons.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924(b) cmt. e (emphasis in block quote added). This 
language could be interpreted as permitting the use of life expectancy tables based on race 
and gender, since life expectancy tables that determine the average life expectancy of 
individuals of a certain race and gender are essentially tables that determine the average 
life expectancy of “a large number of persons.” See id.
17 See infra Part II.A.2.
18 See infra Part II.A.3.
19 See infra Part II.
20 See, e.g., Watson v. S. Shore Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 965 N.E.2d 1200, 1209 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (using a nonblended government table to measure the life expectancy 
of an African-American male); Probst v. Wroten, 433 So. 2d 734, 744 (La. Ct. App. 1982) 
(authorizing worklife expectancy tables based on gender over the plaintiff’s objection 
through the trial court’s discretionary powers); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 294 
N.W.2d 501, 527 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (using yearly government salary tables based on the 
plaintiff’s race), aff’d, 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
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inequalities, but also it creates ex ante incentives for potential tortfeasors that 
encourage future targeting of disadvantaged groups. These incentives are what 
the PhedEx example attempts to demonstrate. We argue that using blended 
tables (tables containing statistics that do not delineate on racial or gender 
lines) would improve not only the fairness of tort law (a claim some feminist 
scholars and one insistent judge have been making for years to no avail), but 
also its efficiency. However, it is extremely difficult to establish that targeting 
the disadvantaged (an incentive the use of nonblended tables provides) is 
inefficient. Conventional wisdom under the economic analysis of law seems to 
be well entrenched in the position that targeting is socially desirable because it 
reduces social costs.21 In this Article we argue the opposite. 
In Part II, we discuss current approaches to determining tort damages. In 
Part A, we provide the first in-depth exploration of how courts use life 
expectancy tables, worklife expectancy tables, and wage tables in calculating 
damages. We then show that despite the historical twentieth century tradition 
of using these tables—a discriminatory common law practice—some initial 
winds of change were introduced in the twenty-first century, and now a few 
courts are willing to apply blended tables. In Part B, we demonstrate that 
courts’ discriminatory approach stems not only from a passive perpetuation of 
old common law practices, but also from legislatures enacting statutes and 
supporting pattern jury instructions that express a preference for race- or 
gender-based tables. Although some jurisdictions strive to neutralize their 
damage awards by relying on race- and gender-blended tables, most tables 
supported by state statute or pattern jury instructions still delineate on race or 
gender lines. In Part C, we explore the academic response to the issue (or lack 
thereof, with the exception of a few dedicated and persistent feminist 
scholars). Here, we also show that generations of lawyers and scholars have 
been conditioned to prefer the principle of restitutio ad integrum to the 
principle of equality. A review of fifteen torts and remedies casebook notes on 
the discriminatory effects of race- and gender-based statistical tables reveals 
that very few casebook authors directly address the potential unfairness, 
unconstitutionality, and inaccuracy of these tables, or the perverse incentives 
that may be created by using them in future damages calculations.
In Part III we show that such incentives, which lead to targeting of the 
disadvantaged, are not a hypothetical problem. We provide empirical evidence 
demonstrating that the targeting of disadvantaged groups exists on the ground, 
and that it might exist because of the lower liability risk these groups 
constitute.
In Part IV we establish that the various theories of tort law (that is, 
corrective justice, distributive justice, and efficiency) have contributed to a 
misunderstanding of proper damages calculations. We then demonstrate how 
these theories can be harnessed instead to mobilize positive change in the 
current practice. In short, distributive justice theories of tort law provide the 
                                                                                                                     
21 See infra Part III.
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easiest avenue for change. This is because those who view tort law from a 
distributive justice perspective are more amenable to the idea that tort law 
cannot comprise part of a discriminatory legal system. 
However, most scholars and courts in the United States either subscribe to 
corrective justice theories or view tort law from the “economic analysis of 
law” lens. Indeed, corrective justice theorists are most likely to resist the 
proposed changes to tort law calculation. These theorists view tort law as a 
means of restoring the equality that existed between the tortfeasor and the 
victim prior to the accident.22 However, the scope of such restoration is limited 
to eliminating any inequality resulting from the tortfeasor’s wrongdoing itself. 
Corrective justice theory does not concern itself with distributive justice or 
problems of discrimination in society.23 Accordingly, subscribers to corrective 
justice believe tort law should aspire to award the victim damages that restore 
her to the position she would most likely have been in, but for the accident.24
Embarrassingly, in our view, this means that a black victim would receive 
much lower damages for the same tort than a white victim would. We 
nonetheless provide some preliminary theoretical outlets for corrective justice 
theorists that might help them avoid taking this embarrassing position and 
instead support the abandonment of race- and gender-based tables. 
Lastly, Part IV.C shows that economic analysis of law also supports using 
nonblended tables because more accurate information—especially when it is 
free of charge, as statistical tables are—is thought to be more efficient. 
Economic analysis of law is not deterred by the targeting incentives tort law 
creates. On the contrary, it embraces them, as it allegedly makes economic 
sense that accidents create as little economic harm as possible. Moreover, like 
corrective justice theorists, law and economics scholars object to fixing broad 
social problems of discrimination via tort law, preferring instead that solutions 
be pursued via broader legislative schemes such as the tax and transfer 
system.25
As in the case of corrective justice, we explore several possible outlets to 
save economic analysis from the embarrassment of supporting discriminatory 
awards. First, the use of nonblended tables might be more inaccurate 
inherently as compared to blended tables. Second, using blended tables helps 
fix job market discrimination by allowing courts to implicitly correct for 
market failures stemming from sexist or racist practices by awarding loss of 
future income based on hypothetical nondiscriminatory efficient markets and 
ignoring wage gaps based on gender and race. Third, we investigate the 
incorporation of notions of equality into the social welfare function in general 
                                                                                                                     
22 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 
349 (2002).
23 See infra Part IV.B.
24 Eliezer Rivlin, Thoughts on Referral to Foreign Law, Global Chain-Novel, and 
Novelty, 21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 17 (2009).
25 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994).
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and into private law in particular—a proposal that counteracts famous 
objections arguing that private law and notions of equality should be treated as 
separate spheres. 
In Part V we reveal that, surprisingly, courts use race- and gender-based 
tables even when awarding damages for violations of federal laws, such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and the National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Act.26 The biggest disappointment is that courts use gender-based tables when 
awarding damages for violations of Title VII.27 There, the very use of these 
tables is jarring, in light of the federal statute’s attempt to reduce 
discrimination based on race and gender. 
In Part VI, we explore various solutions and present the natural policy 
response to the current practice. We propose the adoption of one blended 
worklife table, one blended life expectancy table, and one blended wage table 
for use in damage calculations. 
Apart from the dedicated work primarily of Professors Martha Chamallas 
and Jennifer B. Wriggins, academia has largely ignored this problem. Aside 
from Judge Jack Weinstein, no judge has repeatedly struck down nonblended 
tables.28 Perhaps the issue of the potential unconstitutionality of nonblended 
tables is yet to be presented in a convincing manner, or the inaccuracy of the 
tables is yet to be fully revealed, or an adequate efficiency argument is yet to 
be presented, or perhaps efforts made to date in this regard are intentionally 
ignored. We posit that this problem can no longer be ignored. Courts should 
immediately stop using nonblended tables. 
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DETERMINING TORT DAMAGES
An understanding of how tort law, as applied in the United States, deals 
with damages awards is critical to comprehending the perverse targeting 
incentives tort law creates. In the past, courts routinely accepted race- and 
gender-based tables without raising any concerns,29 and they routinely 
                                                                                                                     
26 See infra Part V.B–.C.
27 See, e.g., Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1178 (N.D. Iowa 
2003) (citing to the U.S. Life Tables when referring to Baker’s life expectancy), aff’d, 382 
F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2004); see also infra Part V.A.
28 See infra pp. 687–88, 700–01.
29 See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, No. 2-91-CV-1033(WWE), 1996 WL 
776585, at *2–3 (D. Conn. Nov. 25, 1996) (accepting the average worklife expectancy for 
a thirty-one-year-old white female as the appropriate base for calculating lost earning 
capacity), aff’d, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998); Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 
1337–38 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (reducing the lost income award on the assumption the female 
plaintiff would marry, bear children, and leave or interrupt her career), aff’d sub nom.
Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Morrison v. State, 516 P.2d 402, 404–05 
(Alaska 1973) (endorsing data for white Alaskan females); Powell v. Parker, 303 S.E.2d 
225, 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming race-based statistics for lost income calculation);
Gilborges v. Wallace, 379 A.2d 269, 277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (implicitly 
endorsing gender-based tables), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 396 A.2d 338 (N.J. 1978);
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continue to do so today.30 In this Part, we discuss current approaches to
determining tort damages. Part A reviews approaches explicitly or implicitly 
approved by courts. Part B shows that many legislatures (shockingly, in our 
view) have adopted statutes or pattern jury instructions that enable race- and 
gender-based damage calculations. Part C reviews viewpoints within the 
academic community: first, focusing on law review articles written by scholars 
addressing the topic; and second, exploring the approach taken by the authors 
of tort law and remedies casebooks that address (or fail to address) 
discrimination in damages awards.
A. Courts
Many find it hard to believe that in 2017, American courts routinely use 
race- and gender-based tables. Perhaps the main reason so few lawyers, 
scholars, and judges are aware of this fact is that these tables’ usage is hidden 
in the testimony provided by forensic economists. Today, as was the case over 
a hundred years ago, plaintiffs seeking damages for future harm and expense 
are typically required to present expert testimony that statistically 
demonstrates the harm they will suffer over their lifetime.31 Generally, 
forensic economists are the damage calculation experts called on to “place 
dollar values on the harms that have occurred.”32 Traditionally, these statistical 
calculations have infused race and gender bias into damage calculations 
through the three major statistical tables mentioned earlier: life expectancy, 
worklife expectancy, and average national wage. Next, we discuss each in 
turn.
                                                                                                                     
Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 501, 527 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) 
(affirming race-based statistics for lost income calculation), aff’d, 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 
1981).
30 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, No. 08-2375-JWL, 2009 WL 5126623, at *8 (D. 
Kan. Dec. 18, 2009) (accepting the average life expectancy for a thirty-year-old black 
female as the appropriate base for calculating future medical expenses); Rhoades v. Walsh, 
No. 08-368-P-H, 2009 WL 2600094, at *11 n.24 (D. Me. Aug. 19, 2009) (recommended 
findings of fact and conclusions of law) (using the Bureau of Labor Statistics worklife 
expectancy for a twenty-six-year-old white male currently active in the workforce as the 
appropriate base for calculating future earnings losses).
31 See, e.g., Ruzzi v. Butler Petrol. Co., 588 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. 1991) (holding that 
presentation of expert testimony was appropriate to assist the jury in calculating the 
plaintiff’s lost earning capacity). For an example of how damage calculations are usually 
presented in court, see Moody v. Blanchard Place Apartments, 793 So. 2d 281, 299–301 
(La. Ct. App. 2001).
32 Thomas R. Ireland, The Role of a Forensic Economist in a Damage Assessment for 
Personal Injuries, in MEASURING LOSS IN CATASTROPHIC INJURY CASES 15, 16 (Kevin S. 
Marshall & Thomas R. Ireland eds., 2006).
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1. Life Expectancy Tables
Life expectancy comprises a major component in calculating a plaintiff’s
future medical expenses and future pain and suffering damages.33 To 
determine future medical expenses, courts typically instruct the jury to 
determine the total cost of the future medical payments the plaintiff must 
endure over the rest of his or her life.34 A similar exercise applies for future 
pain and suffering damages,35 except in the type of evidence presented to the 
jury regarding the pain and suffering the plaintiff will endure after all 
economic costs have been reimbursed. 
Proof of remaining life expectancy usually begins with using a life 
expectancy table to determine the total life expectancy of an individual who 
has reached the plaintiff’s age.36 Although tables do not provide conclusive 
proof of life expectancy, and the jury is encouraged to adjust the figure based 
on evidence of the specific plaintiff’s health and habits, the tables often 
determine juries’ findings.37 Generally, courts prefer to receive the most 
reliable table available. Accordingly, experts tend to present evidence based on 
the most recent version of the federal government’s U.S. Life Tables.38 The 
U.S. Life Tables provide life expectancy statistics for the population as a 
whole, for each gender, and for certain racial categories (white, black, 
Hispanic, non-Hispanic white, and non-Hispanic black), as well as for genders 
within those racial categories.39
Traditionally, experts provided life expectancy statistics specific to the 
plaintiff’s gender and race.40 Practically, this means that a black boy and a 
white boy who suffer an identical injury at age one would receive significantly 
disparate awards for future medical expenses. To provide some idea about the 
scale of this gap, a simple (even simplistic) back-of-the-envelope calculation 
can be illuminating. Assume annual medical expenses for each boy is $2,000. 
Using the most recent U.S. Life Tables, the black boy would receive a damage 
                                                                                                                     
33 See Robert J. Thornton & Frank Slesnick, New Estimates of Life Expectancies for 
Persons with Medical Risks, 10 J. FORENSIC ECON. 285, 285 (1997).
34 Ireland, supra note 32, at 31; see also Thornton & Slesnick, supra note 33, at 285.
35 See, e.g., Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1167, 1177 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(awarding pain and suffering damages for the plaintiff’s remaining life expectancy of 
fourteen years), aff’d in part, rev’d and remanded in part, 917 F.2d 1320 (2d Cir. 1990).
36 See Thornton & Slesnick, supra note 33, at 285, 287–90.
37 4 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 36.02 & n.35 (2004) 
(citing Sullivan v. Price, 386 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1980)).
38 See, e.g., id. § 36.02 n.34 (citing McCue v. Low, 385 N.E.2d 1162 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979)); see also T.W. ANDERSON, LIFE EXPECTANCY IN COURT 21–22 (2002) (using U.S. 
Life Tables as a foundation for life expectancy calculation); Richard B. Singer, How to 
Prepare a Life Expectancy Report for an Attorney in a Tort Case, 37 J. INS. MED. 42, 43 
(2005) (using U.S. Life Tables as a foundation for life expectancy calculation).
39 See, e.g., Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2008, NAT’L VITAL STAT.
REP., Sept. 24, 2012, at 1, 4 tbl.B.
40 See, e.g., Thornton & Slesnick, supra note 33, at 286.
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award that was $11,000 less than the white boy, simply because of his race.41
Applying the same scenario to white siblings results in the white boy receiving 
$9,600 less than his sister, simply because of his gender.42
Often, when life expectancy is adjusted to account for specific injuries or 
health conditions, further race- and gender-based bias is imported into the 
calculation. Many forensic economists apply “relative mortality ratios”43 to 
reflect life expectancy reductions due to disability or health factors such as 
paraplegia or smoking habits. Often, these relative mortality ratios are 
particularized to race and gender.44 This further compounds race- and gender-
based disparities in damage award calculations.
Traditionally, courts have accepted the use of race- and gender-based life 
expectancy statistics unquestioningly in the calculation of future medical 
expense and pain and suffering damages.45 Astonishingly, many continue to 
do so today.46
                                                                                                                     
41 According to the 2008 U.S. Life Tables, the statistical life expectancy of a one-
year-old white male is 75.5 years. Arias, supra note 39, at 4 tbl.B. The statistical life 
expectancy of a one-year-old black male is 70.6 years. Id. To calculate the difference 
above, we multiplied the life expectancy by the assumed $2,000 annual medical expenses 
for both individuals. The difference was $11,000.
42 According to the 2008 U.S. Life Tables, the statistical life expectancy of a one-
year-old white male is 75.5 years. Id. The statistical life expectancy of a one-year-old white 
female is 80.3 years. Id. To calculate the difference above, we multiplied the life 
expectancy by the assumed $2,000 annual medical expenses for both individuals. The 
difference was $9,600. 
43 The relative mortality ratio (RMR) represents the relative chances a person is likely 
to die in any year, as compared to the general population (for example, an RMR of two 
means the person is twice as likely to die in any year, an RMR of three means the person is 
three times as likely to die in any year, and so on). Thornton & Slesnick, supra note 33, at 
285.
44 See, e.g., id. at 287–90.
45 See, e.g., Watson v. S. Shore Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 965 N.E.2d 1200, 1209 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (using a nonblended government table to measure the life expectancy 
of an African-American male).
46 See, e.g., Adkins v. Asbestos Corp., 18 F.3d 1349, 1350–51 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(upholding the trial court’s use of a standard life expectancy table particularized to the 
plaintiff’s race and gender in calculating the life expectancy for future pain and suffering 
damages); Smith v. United States, No. 08-2375-JWL, 2009 WL 5126623, at *8 (D. Kansas 
Dec. 18, 2009) (accepting the average life expectancy for a thirty-year-old black female as 
the appropriate base for calculating future medical expenses); Diebold v. Gulf States 
Optical Lab., Inc., No. CIV.A. 96-579, 1997 WL 537689, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 1997) 
(awarding the plaintiff, who suffered a back injury during a car accident, $3,000 for future 
medical expenses—calculated on the assumption of $40/month chiropractic treatment over 
his remaining life, which for a white male of his age was 9.6 years); Smith v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs, 865 F. Supp. 433, 441 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (using the life expectancy for an 
average man of the plaintiff’s age and race, discounted to account for his schizophrenia, to 
calculate the plaintiff’s future medical expenses).
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2. Worklife Expectancy Tables
In the United States, worklife expectancy comprises a major factor in the 
calculation of a plaintiff’s damages for the loss of future earning capacity.47
To determine loss of future earning capacity, courts typically instruct the jury 
to determine the plaintiff’s future earnings for the duration of his or her 
worklife expectancy.48 Whereas courts in other countries use their country’s
mandatory retirement age as a relevant benchmark,49 since (in general) no 
mandatory retirement age exists in the United States, courts draw on the 
results of labor market analysis to predict future patterns of earnings and 
employment for the individual plaintiff.50 Since women and blacks fare worse 
in the labor market,51 they fare worse in torts as well. 
Just like life expectancy tables, worklife expectancy tables provide the 
starting point for determinations of loss of future earning capacity and may be 
adjusted according to the plaintiff’s circumstances.52 While various tables are 
available,53 many experts rely on worklife expectancy tables set forth by the 
                                                                                                                     
47 See Ireland, supra note 32, at 26–30.
48 See id.
49 For a discussion of Israel’s worklife expectancy, see Rivlin, supra note 24, at 22–
26. For a similar discussion of Australia’s, see PAUL THOMSON ET AL., EXPERT ACTUARIAL
EVIDENCE 6–9, https://www.cumsar.com.au/docs/expert_actuarial_evidence.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/RD7Z-U3B8]. For a discussion of England’s, see What Retirement Age Should Be 
Agreed For Loss of Earnings Claims?, KENNEDYS (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.kennedyslaw.com/article/defaultretirementage/ [https://perma.cc/X6BG-
GLKT].
50 See Shirley J. Smith, Revised Worklife Tables Reflect 1979–80 Experience, in
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 2254, WORKLIFE 
ESTIMATES: EFFECTS OF RACE AND EDUCATION 1, 1–2 (Feb. 1986), https://www.bls.gov/op
ub/reports/worklife-estimates/archive/worklife-estimates-1986.pdf [https://perma.cc/U33N-
LPFQ].
51 Id. at 4–5.
52 Just as in life expectancy calculations, either side can present evidence that adjusts 
the statistical worklife expectancy up or down depending on characteristics of the 
particular individual in question. See, e.g., Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 735 F. Supp.
1167, 1176 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (reducing the plaintiff’s worklife expectancy from the 
statistical worklife expectancy because he testified as to his preaccident intention to retire 
several years earlier than his statistical worklife expectancy), aff’d in part, rev’d and 
remanded in part, 917 F.2d 1320 (2d Cir. 1990).
53 Alternative calculations include other worklife expectancy tables, see Thomas R. 
Ireland, Why Markov Process Worklife Expectancy Tables Are Usually Superior to the 
LPE Method, 16 J. LEGAL ECON. 95, 100–01 (2010), and worklife probability tables (LPE
method), see VOCATIONAL ECON., INC., CALCULATION OF WORKLIFE EXPECTANCY USING 
THE LIFE, PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT METHOD 1 (2006), http://www.vocecon.com/resou
rces/ftp/data/lpecalc.pdf [https://perma.cc/T33X-ULQG] (computing “a person’s 
probability of working in any particular year by combining his or her probabilities of life 
(L), participation (P), and employment (E) into a joint probability”).
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Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)54 or on the Skoog, Ciecka, and Krueger 
tables.55 The BLS tables provide worklife expectancies for gender, for certain 
racial categories (white and “[b]lack and other”), and for genders within those 
racial categories.56 The Skoog, Ciecka, and Krueger tables provide worklife 
expectancies by gender at various levels of educational attainment.57 Experts 
sometimes employ worklife expectancy tables particularized to specific 
industries58 or tables particularized to a specific disability.59
                                                                                                                     
54 See 2 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 10.03(3)(c)(iv)
(2016); see also 29 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 53 (1995) (using Department of Labor 
statistics as the basis for average worklife expectancy in model expert testimony regarding 
loss of earning capacity).
55 Frank L. Slesnick et al., A 2012 Survey of Forensic Economics: Their Methods, 
Estimates, and Perspectives, 24 J. FORENSIC ECON. 67, 86–87 (2013).
56 See, e.g., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 50, at 9 tbl.A-1, 13 tbl.A-2, 15 
tbl.A-4, 19 tbl.A-5.
57 See, e.g., Edward M. Foster & Gary R. Skoog, The Markov Assumption for 
Worklife Expectancy, 17 J. FORENSIC ECON. 167, 181 (2004); Kurt V. Krueger et al., 
Worklife in a Markov Model with Full-Time and Part-Time Activity, 19 J. FORENSIC ECON.
61, 64–65, 74–77, 79–82 (2006); Gary R. Skoog et al., The Markov Process Model of 
Labor Force Activity: Extended Tables of Central Tendency, Shape, Percentile Points, and 
Bootstrap Standard Errors, 22 J. FORENSIC ECON. 165, 183–221 (2011) [hereinafter Skoog 
et al., Markov Process Model]. See generally Gary R. Skoog & James E. Ciecka, A Markov 
(Increment-Decrement) Model of Labor Force Activity: Extended Tables of Central 
Tendency, Variation, and Probability Intervals, 11 J. LEGAL ECON. 23 (2001) (using
extensive tables for every age up to seventy-five, with five different levels of education).
58 For example, Skoog and Ciecka have produced worklife tables for major-league 
baseball players and railroad workers. Gary R. Skoog & James E. Ciecka, An 
Autoregressive Model of Order Two for Worklife Expectancies and Other Labor Force 
Characteristics with an Application to Major League Baseball Hitters, 18 J. LEGAL ECON.
47, 48, 55–63 (2012); Gary R. Skoog & James E. Ciecka, Worklife Expectancy via 
Competing Risks/Multiple Decrement Theory with an Application to Railroad Workers, 19 
J. FORENSIC ECON. 243, 248–57 (2006). Neither of these tables distinguishes its findings on 
race or gender lines. However, the admissibility of the railroad workers table is 
questionable; the Eastern District of Wisconsin criticized it as unreliable in an unpublished 
2012 decision. Larson v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., No. 10-C-446, 2012 WL 359665, at *5 (E.D. 
Wis. Feb. 2, 2012) (order on motions in limine regarding opinions of expert economist and 
loss of pension benefits) (citing Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 
1993)).
59 See, e.g., A.M. GAMBOA JR. & DAVID S. GIBSON, GAMBOA GIBSON WORKLIFE 
TABLES: BY GENDER, LEVEL OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, AND TYPE OF DISABILITY
(2010). Some disagreement exists among legal economists as to the reliability of these 
tables. Legal economist Thomas Ireland claims that the Gamboa-Gibson tables are 
unreliable and without merit, arguing that (1) the data underlying the tables comes from 
government sources that were not intended to collect information on the prevalence of 
permanent disabilities, (2) the LPE method is not effective when a disability variable is 
introduced, and (3) general disability status is not reflective of worklife expectancy 
particularized to a specific injury. Thomas R. Ireland, Why the Gamboa-Gibson Disability 
Work-Life Expectancy Tables Are Without Merit, 15 J. LEGAL ECON. 105, 105–06 (2009).
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In sum, courts routinely accept worklife expectancy statistics specific to 
the particular race and gender of the plaintiff.60 As in the past, juries can make 
adjustments to base-salary estimations that provide an additional opportunity 
for race- and gender-based damage award gaps to arise.61
To demonstrate the implications, a further back-of-the-envelope 
calculation is due. According to the most recent BLS statistics, a white boy 
and a black girl with the same projected educational levels who were injured 
identically at age sixteen would receive monumentally different damage 
awards.62 Assuming each earned an averaged annual income of $25,000, the 
white male would receive $302,500 more in future loss of earning capacity 
than the black woman.63
3. Wage Tables
The third important factor that gives rise to race and gender discrimination 
in tort damages is the average national wage. Generally, courts integrate the 
plaintiff’s established earnings record with her worklife expectancy to predict 
future loss of earning capacity.64 However, when the earnings record is not 
reflective of the individual’s projected earnings—because she is either a child 
and thus without an earnings record or a young adult whose current job does 
                                                                                                                     
60 But see MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE & STAN V. SMITH, ECONOMIC/HEDONIC 
DAMAGES 127 (1990), for an argument that experts should separately analyze a black male 
who demonstrates a record of continuous workforce participation and employment because 
the expert would be disserving him by adjusting his earning capacity to that provided by 
the table. However, Brookshire and Smith also argue that worklife adjustments should be 
categorized by race and sex, because although probabilities of worklife expectancy are 
lower for the average black person as opposed to the average white person, the differential 
is not as great for black females. Id.
61 After calculating the base annual income and multiplying it over the individual’s
work life expectancy, legal economists usually take additional factors into account, 
including the salary growth rate, personal consumption rate, nonmarket loss, taxes, and 
discount rate for inflation. T.L. “Smith” Boykin III, The Economist’s New Clothes:
Exposing Unreliable Testimony, DRI FOR DEF., Sept. 2011, at 36, 38–41, 86. Both the 
salary growth rate and the personal consumption rate can be particularized to race and 
gender. See id. at 40–41; see also ELIZABETH M. KING & JAMES P. SMITH, COMPUTING 
ECONOMIC LOSS IN CASES OF WRONGFUL DEATH 36–40 (1988).
62 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 50, at 6 tbl.5.
63 In practice, race and gender will inform forensic economists’ projections of the 
plaintiff’s educational attainment, resulting in even larger gaps. See id. at 5 tbl.4.
Furthermore, the size of the gap increases as expected annual income rises. Annual 
incomes over $25,000 result in significant increases in the total gap. This increased 
income-exacerbated gap is likely to occur where, for example, the plaintiffs had already 
applied for college, even if they went to the same college, sat in all classes together, and 
received the same grades on all exams.
64 See Ireland, supra note 32, at 26.
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not reflect her ultimate career—courts rely on the BLS’ annual wage tables.65
For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that in wrongful death cases 
for children, who cannot establish earnings records, the Department of Labor’s
average national wage comprises the appropriate starting point for calculating 
future lost earning capacity, which can be adjusted up or down upon 
presentation of “credible evidence.”66 At their most general, these tables 
provide average national wage statistics for males and females.67 However, 
they also provide data by educational level68 and occupation.69 Because 
choosing a wage-base involves a consideration of expected future earnings, 
broad discretion is afforded to the forensic economist, whose decision must, of 
course, conform to “a common sense standard of reasonableness.”70
Most courts prefer that projected average earnings be adjusted according 
to predictions particularized to the plaintiffs regarding their likely educational 
attainment, in light of their personal characteristics and family background.71
                                                                                                                     
65 See, e.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269, 1277 (Miss. 2000) (en 
banc).
66 Id. (“[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that the deceased child’s income would 
have been the equivalent of the national average as set forth by the United States 
Department of Labor. . . . Either party may rebut the presumption by presenting relevant 
credible evidence to the finder of fact. Such evidence might include, but is certainly not 
limited to, testimony regarding the child’s age, life expectancy, precocity, mental and 
physical health, intellectual development, and relevant family circumstances. This evidence 
will allow the litigants to tailor their proof to the aptitudes and talents of the individual’s
life being measured.”).
67 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA 
ANNUAL AVERAGES: 2. EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL 
POPULATION 16 YEARS AND OVER BY SEX, 1975 TO DATE (2015), https://www.bls.gov/cps/a
a2015/cpsaat02.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR92-Y7SE].
68 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA 
ANNUAL AVERAGES: 7. EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL 
POPULATION 25 YEARS AND OVER BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, SEX, RACE, AND
HISPANIC OR LATINO ETHNICITY (2015), https://www.bls.gov/cps/aa2015/cpsaat04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BC4T-LPGB].
69 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA 
ANNUAL AVERAGES: 39. MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE AND SALARY 
WORKERS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION AND SEX (2015), https://www.bls.gov/cps/aa2015/cps
aat39.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4FP-JPVX].
70 George A. Barrett & Michael L. Brookshire, Assessing Economic Damages in 
Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Litigation: The State of West Virginia, 16 J. FORENSIC 
ECON. 315, 317 (2003). 
71 Courts usually consider the individual plaintiff according to his or her race and 
gender. See, e.g., Wheeler Tarpeh–Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 455 (D.D.C. 
1991) (discussing expert’s use of the average wage for black male college graduates in 
calculating lost income for an eight-year-old boy suffering from blindness and neurological 
damage resulting from medical negligence), rev’d sub nom. Tarpeh–Doe v. United States, 
28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reversing on grounds that the defendant was not liable in 
tort); Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) 
(affirming the jury’s use of female average wage in lost earning capacity calculation and 
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Courts generally favor the opinions of such vocational experts over those of 
medical doctors.72 Such projections reinforce the already existent 
discriminatory effects of plaintiffs’ race or gender on their access to education 
and opportunities and essentially perpetuate that discrimination into the 
future.73 Take, for example, a recent Mississippi case, wherein an expert 
testified that the average income for a high school graduate was $28,631 and 
for a junior college graduate was $36,021.74 Assume a court is calculating 
future lost earning capacity for our white and black males from the previous 
example. Even assuming that both plaintiffs have the same worklife 
expectancy, if (based on familial patterns) the court uses the average national 
earnings for a junior college graduate for the white boy and the earnings for a 
high school graduate for the black boy, the white plaintiff will receive 
$294,861 more in damages than the black plaintiff.
4. Weak Winds of Change
It is puzzling how such a discriminatory practice has survived for so many 
years. In one case, the court noted that the expert involved in economic 
damage calculations “testified that no one had ever asked him to provide race-
and sex-neutral calculations in wrongful death cases,” even though he had 
performed thousands of income-loss analyses throughout his career.75 That 
said, despite a long history of race- and gender-based damage calculations in 
                                                                                                                     
noting: “This Court will not consider it error for a jury to refuse to minimize an award of 
lost minimum wages for an infant female on the assumption that the average wage for 
women in the future will still be only two-thirds of the average wage for men.”); see also
Musick v. Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 960, 964 (W.D. Va. 2011); Athridge 
v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 (D.D.C. 1996), aff’d per curiam., Nos. 96-7261, 
89CV01222, 1997 WL 404854 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
72 E.g., Barrett & Brookshire, supra note 70, at 319. 
73 For a discussion on this issue in a foreign context, see the Israeli case Migdal 
Insurance Co. v. Rim Abu Hanna, which comments that “[r]estoring the status quo under 
the heading of loss of earning power means bringing the injured person to the place 
destined for him in the future, not returning him to the position of his forefathers (and 
foremothers) were in the past.” CA 100064/02 Migdal Ins. Co. v. Abu-Hana (3) TakSC 
3932 (2005) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/640/100/p04/02100640.p04.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/44XP-T8FL]. This case is discussed further in Rivlin, supra note 24, at 22.
74 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Learmonth, 95 So. 3d 633, 638 (Miss. 2012) (en banc).
75 United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1315 (D. Utah 2004), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005). This expert’s
experience was echoed in conversations on the subject that we have had with practicing 
lawyers and is also reflected in our own experience. The lawyers interviewed—who 
represent plaintiffs in tort suits—were completely unaware of how experts sourced their 
statistics and had never thought about questions of race and gender discrimination in this 
context.
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both personal injury and wrongful death actions,76 finally some courts in the 
United States and other countries have begun to shift toward a race- or gender-
neutral framework, although primarily with regard to future lost earning 
capacity awards and life expectancy.77 For example, in Wheeler Tarpeh–Doe,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia required that the 
loss of future earnings of a mixed-race plaintiff be based on race- and gender-
neutral calculations.78 The court found that average black male earnings were 
not representative of the plaintiff’s earning capacity and, more broadly, that “it
would be inappropriate to incorporate current discrimination resulting in wage 
differences between the sexes or races or the potential for any future such 
discrimination into a calculation for damages resulting from lost wages.”79
For the sake of context, recall another famous mixed-race case—Plessy v. 
Ferguson, decided in 1896—wherein Plessy, despite being seven-eighths 
white, was still kicked off of a train.80 The nineteenth century ended; the 
twentieth century ended. Is the only progress made throughout the centuries 
that mixed-race children are now treated like whites? The good news is that a 
few courts have recently ignored gender and race even for nonmixed race, 
minority plaintiffs.81 The bad news is that only a few have done so. 
                                                                                                                     
76 Courts have been long disposed toward using nonblended life expectancy, worklife, 
and salary tables in wrongful death actions as well. See, e.g., Watson v. S. Shore Nursing 
& Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 965 N.E.2d 1200, 1209 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (using a nonblended 
government table to measure the life expectancy of a black male); Probst v. Wroten, 433 
So. 2d 734, 744 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (authorizing worklife expectancy tables based on 
gender over the plaintiff’s objection through the trial court’s discretionary powers); 
Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 501, 527 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (using 
yearly government salary tables based on the plaintiff’s race), aff’d, 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 
1981).
77 In Canada, courts have moved toward a gender-neutral conception of damages 
awards. See, e.g., Shaw ex rel. Shaw v. Arnold, 1998 CarswellBC 2731, para. 69 (Can. 
B.C. S.C.) (WL) (calculating future loss of earnings for a female plaintiff by averaging the 
damages for a man and a woman of the plaintiff’s age); Walker v. Ritchie, 2003 
CarswellOnt 10, para. 132 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.) (WL) (holding that the use of gender-
neutral average income statistics was appropriate in calculating the plaintiff’s future loss of 
income), aff’d, [2006] 197 O.A.C. 81 (Can. Ont. C.A.), rev’d, 2006 SCC 45, [2006] 2
S.C.R. 428 (Can.). In the Israeli case Migdal Insurance Co. (3) TakSC 3932, the court 
commented that “[r]estoring the status quo under the heading of loss of earning power 
means bringing the injured person to the place destined for him in the future, not returning 
him to the position of his forefathers (and foremothers) were in the past,” as discussed 
further in Rivlin, supra note 24, at 22. For examples of such practices in the United States, 
see G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez–Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015), and McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 248–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
78 Wheeler Tarpeh–Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 455 (D.D.C. 1991), rev’d 
sub nom. Tarpeh–Doe v. United States, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reversing on grounds 
that the defendant was not liable in tort).
79 Id.
80 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541–42 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
81 See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.
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For example, in United States v. Bedonie, the District Court of Utah 
declined to apply race- and gender-based data in assessing damages for the 
loss of future income of two Native American victims.82 The court concluded 
that blended, race- and gender-neutral data should be used, unless the 
defendant could prove that the reduction based on race or gender was 
warranted.83 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed that reduced damage 
awards based on nonblended statistics were inappropriate under the 
circumstances of the case.84 The district court “observ[ed] that ‘[a]s a matter 
of fairness, the court should exercise its discretion in favor of victims of 
violent crime and against the possible perpetuation of inappropriate 
stereotypes,’” and the Tenth Circuit ruled that it was thus within the district 
court’s discretion to reject a race-based approach.85
While these courts declined to apply race and gender tables because they 
were “inappropriate” or “unwarranted,” others have declined to use race- or 
gender-based statistics on the rationale that racial and gendered disparities 
reflected in the tables should have little effect in the long term. For example, in 
Reilly v. United States, the court rejected the expert’s suggested reduction of a 
female plaintiff’s loss of earning capacity by 40%, which was based on the 
BLS’ determination that a woman of her age would have fewer remaining 
years in the workforce than a man of her age.86 The court commented thus: 
“[a]s a factual matter, I seriously doubt the probative value of such a statistic 
with respect to twenty-first century women’s employment patterns, 
particularly in light of current, ongoing changes in women’s labor force 
participation rates.”87 Similarly, in Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp., the court 
declined to reduce a black, female plaintiff’s future earnings on racial or 
gendered calculations because the court “recognize[d] the likelihood that these 
disadvantages will have considerably less impact in the future on the ability of 
a black female . . . to obtain gainful employment comparable to that available 
to white males.”88
Interestingly, these courts made no constitutional arguments about using 
race and gender, but only argued that using these tables was inappropriate as a 
                                                                                                                     
82 United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1319 (D. Utah 2004), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005). These are 
two consolidated cases. Id. at 1288. One concerns a Native American teenage boy who 
died in a DUI car accident, id. at 1288–89, and the other concerns a Native American baby 
girl who was killed by her father, id. 1291–92. The court needed to determine damages 
under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. Id. at 1298–99, 1302.
83 Id. at 1319.
84 United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1126 (10th Cir. 2007). 
85 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1319).
86 Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 997 (D.R.I. 1987), aff’d in part and 
remanded, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988).
87 Id.
88 Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 368 (6th Cir. 1978).
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matter of actuarial science.89 Neither did these courts attempt to reveal the 
perverse targeting incentives such rules provide to potential tortfeasors.90
B. Legislatures
Tort law is state law; therefore, undesirable common law practices can be 
reformed by state legislatures, if seen fit. Indeed, over the past few decades, all 
states have passed laws overriding the common law of torts—caps on damages 
being the classic example.91 Thus, one might have expected states to enact 
statutes mandating blended or neutral life expectancy tables to mitigate similar 
concerns. In fact, several states have elected to adopt statutes or pattern jury 
instructions that express preference for specific life expectancy or worklife 
expectancy tables in damage awards.92 Alas, most of the tables receiving such 
support delineate on race or gender lines.93
Specifically, three states have codified their own life expectancy tables.94
Of these, North Carolina has codified blended tables based only on age and 
does not delineate between races or genders.95 The other two—South Carolina 
and Virginia—have codified race-neutral tables, but distinguish between 
genders.96 In contrast, three states—Colorado, Georgia, and Rhode Island—
have passed statutes that guarantee admissibility of certain life expectancy and 
worklife expectancy tables for proof of life and worklife expectancy,97 yet 
these tables are separated by race and gender.98 Many more states have pattern 
                                                                                                                     
89 See generally Drayton, 591 F.2d 352; Reilly, 665 F. Supp. 976.
90 See Drayton, 591 F.2d at 368 (declining to assign specific figures for future earning 
computations as opposed to judicial discretion of all factors); Reilly, 665 F. Supp. at 997 
(doubting the probative value of such statistics).
91 See generally Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (5th) (Univ. of 
Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. e555, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=902711 [https://perma.cc/G2PG-TX9X] (state by state dataset of the most prevalent tort 
reforms in the United States between 1980 and 2012).
92 See infra notes 94–102.
93 See, e.g., Eackelbary v. Nipper, No. 9476, slip op. at 11 (Ohio Ct. App. May 21, 
1980) (gender-based instruction listing “sex” as a factor (quoting Immel v. Richards, 93 
N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ohio 1950))); see also Franchell v. Sims, 424 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1980) (same); King v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., No. 87-199-II, 1987 WL 
26384, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1987) (citing Crowe v. Provost, 374 S.W.2d 645
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1963)) (same).
94 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-150 (2014); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-419 (2015).
95 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46.
96 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-150; VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-419.
97 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-102 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-14-44 (2013); 9 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-19-38 (2012).
98 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-102; GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-14-44; 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-
19-38. Amazingly, before 2014 Colorado mandated a table which was only based on age, 
just like North Carolina. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-103 (repealed 2014).
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jury instructions that express a preference for certain life expectancy tables.99
Of the jury instructions we examined, eleven had relevant provisions.100 Ten 
provisions delineate along gender lines.101 Six are race-neutral, leaving five 
that distinguish along racial lines.102
Interestingly, nearly all other tort reform statutes, such as caps on 
noneconomic damages, were challenged in state court as being unfair or 
contradictory to public policy, or for violating various constitutional 
provisions—including equal protection and due process.103 And yet, our 
efforts revealed no attempt to strike down any of these statutes on the basis 
that they themselves were unfair, in contradiction of public policy, or 
unconstitutional. 
C. Scholars
1. Articles and Law Reviews
Since the 1990s, a growing body of literature has drawn attention to the 
discriminatory effects of using race- and gender-based tables in damage award 
                                                                                                                     
99 See infra note 101.
100 See infra note 101.
101 These states include Alaska, California, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New York, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. ALASKA CIVIL PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 20.13 (ALASKA CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. 2016); CAL.
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3932 (JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. 2016); PATTERN 
INSTRUCTIONS KAN. CIVIL 4th § 171.45 (KAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 2008); MICH. MODEL
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 53.01–.02 (MICH. COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 2017); 4A MINN. PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL § 91.85
(MINN. DISTRICT JUDGES ASS’N, 6th ed. 2014); 1B N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—
CIVIL app. A (COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS’N OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE STATE OF N.Y., 3d ed. 2010); 2 N.D. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL 
§§ 70.47, .50 (STATE BAR ASS’N OF N.D. & N.D. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMM’N
2000); 8 TENN. PRACTICE: TENN. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL app. C (COMM. ON 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) OF THE TENN. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 2012); 6 WASH.
PRACTICE: WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 34.04 (WASH. SUPREME COURT 
COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 6th ed. 2012); RONALD W. EADES, KY. WRONGFUL DEATH 
ACTIONS § 13:3 (2012). Of the states that we examined, only New Jersey’s court rules 
identified tables that were gender-neutral. N.J. Ct. R. 1:13-5, app. I.
102 Of the states above, Alaska, California, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and
Washington expressed a preference for race-neutral tables or statistics. ALASKA CIVIL 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 20.13; CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3932; 4A MINN.
PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL § 91.85; N.J. Ct. R. 1:13-5, app. I; 1B N.Y.
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL app. A; 6 WASH. PRACTICE: WASH. PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 34.04. The remainder of the states supported race-based tables. 
PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS KAN. CIVIL 4th § 171.45; MICH. MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
§§ 53.01–.02; 2 N.D. PATTERN JURY INST.—CIVIL §§ 70.47, .50; 8 TENN. PRACTICE: TENN.
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL app. C; EADES, supra note 101, § 13:3.
103 See generally Avraham, supra note 91.
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calculations.104 Scholars recognize that a trial judge’s decision to admit 
nonblended tables in damage award calculations can be couched as state action 
and is therefore unconstituional.105 They generally argue that race- and 
gender-based tables perpetuate existing social inequalities by locking plaintiffs 
into the life expectancies or worklife expectancies of their predecessors, which 
in practice means locking them into historical racial and gendered inequities. 
Yet, as demonstrated earlier, courts largely ignore these criticisms.106
As mentioned earlier, a few dedicated scholars—primarily Martha 
Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins—are still studying the full legal and societal 
implications of race- and gender-based future damage awards. These scholars 
advocate for one of two major solutions to the problem: using either blended 
tables107 or male tables108 to calculate loss of earning capacity. Although these 
                                                                                                                     
104 See, e.g., infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text; see also Elaine Gibson, The 
Gendered Wage Dilemma in Personal Injury Damages (attempting to “expose hidden 
biases” in calculating damages and examining how “these biases contribute to the 
impoverishment of disabled women”), in TORT THEORY 185, 185 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson 
& Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Alec Shelby Bayer, Comment, Looking Beyond the Easy Fix 
and Delving into the Roots of the Real Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 111, 128–29 (2005) (finding that women—housewives in particular—stand to 
lose more when noneconomic damages are curtailed because the value of contributions to 
the family, such as cooking, general domestic upkeep, etc., will remain uncompensated and 
she will only be able to recover for medical bills); Amanda Edwards, Note, Medical 
Malpractice Non-Economic Damages Caps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 213, 221 (2006)
(“[B]ecause of unique harms that affect women and minorities, jury tendencies, and 
reliance upon flawed economic tables, non-economic damages caps silently plague these 
groups.”).
105 See, e.g. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Constitution Day Lecture: Constitutional Law and 
Tort Law: Injury, Race, Gender, and Equal Protection, 63 ME. L. REV. 263, 272 & n.48 
(2010) (discussing the equal protection implications of nonblended tables and the 
plausibility of finding state action).
106 See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 
711 (2013) (citing McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2008),
for the proposition that use of race-neutral data in courts has been given legal effect); see 
also Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities in Personal Injury 
Claims Through Female-Specific Contingencies, 49 MCGILL L.J. 309, 311 (2004) (arguing 
that when judges sanction the awarding of depressed damages to tort claimants from 
historically disadvantaged groups, they reinforce the marginalization of minorities in 
society); Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the 
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1439 (2005) (“[H]istorical 
patterns of discrimination in the labor market are replicated in tort awards, even though the 
labor force participation of women and minorities may be changing rapidly.”); Deirdre M. 
Smith, The Disordered and Discredited Plaintiff: Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Litigation,
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 821–22 (2010) (citing McMillan, 253 F.R.D. at 250, 255–56, to 
support the argument that use of race-based statistics should be discontinued); cf. Michael 
I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The Unwitting Policy Making of 
Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771, 797 (2010) (“[T]he introduction of 
racially-based DNA numbers into a courtroom proceeding is fundamentally misleading.”).
107 MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURIES 158–70 
(2010); Chamallas, supra note 106, at 1445, 1450; see also Meyerson & Meyerson, supra 
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scholars refer to race- and gender-based statistics generally, they do not 
discuss in much detail the impact these statistics have on future medical 
expenses or future pain and suffering damages.109 Rather, they limit their 
analysis to future loss of income.110 However, as discussed above, these 
overlooked expenses comprise an important component of companies’ ex ante
liability calculations and targeting incentives, and thus are critical to damage 
award calculations.111
2. Casebooks
Although critiques of nonblended tables have reached first-year tort 
casebooks, discussion of racial and gender bias in future damage awards 
receives far less attention in these casebooks than do other doctrinal and 
economic issues. Our review of fifteen current torts and remedies casebooks 
revealed that only six torts and two remedies casebooks mention or discuss the 
role of race and gender in damages calculations.112 Within this subset of eight 
textbooks, most of which are over 1,000 pages long, attention granted to this 
issue spans from a few sentences on the use of statistical tables to anchor 
future damages calculations to a few pages on the critical implications of race-
and gender-based statistics.113
                                                                                                                     
note 106, at 810; Wriggins, supra note 105, at 275; Wriggins, supra note 3, at 60–61; 
Laura Greenberg, Comment, Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for 
Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 429, 430 (2001).
108 ASS’N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM., SHOW ME THE MONEY: CALCULATING 
ECONOMIC DAMAGES (Feb. 2003), Westlaw WINTER2003 ATLA-CLE 325; Martha 
Chamallas, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages 
Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 51, 70–71 (2003).
109 See supra notes 107–08; infra notes 110–11.
110 See Chamallas, supra note 106, at 1438; Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 106, at 
802; Greenberg, supra note 107, at 430.
111 Scholars may not focus on future medical costs and pain and suffering awards 
because using these blended tables might leave women worse off. 
112 The following books were reviewed: GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1000, 1007 (5th ed. 2012); 3 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE 
LAW OF TORTS 23–24 (2d ed. 2011); MEREDITH J. DUNCAN & RONALD TURNER, TORTS (2d 
ed. 2012); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS 857–59 (10th ed. 2012); WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS (2d ed. 
2009); JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW 478 (2d ed. 2008); JAMES A. HENDERSON,
JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 558–71 (7th ed. 2007); CANDACE S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER 
ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES (8th ed. 2011); DOUGLAS 
LAYCOCK ET AL., MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 211–12 (4th ed. 2010); DAVID I. LEVINE 
ET AL., REMEDIES 528–35 (5th ed. 2009); EMILY SHERWIN ET AL., AMES, CHAFEE, AND RE
ON REMEDIES (2012); ELAINE W. SHOBEN ET AL., REMEDIES (5th ed. 2012); ROBERT S.
THOMPSON ET AL., REMEDIES (4th ed. 2009); AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON,
JR., TORTS 668 (2d ed. 2008); and FRANK J. VANDALL ET AL., TORTS (3d ed. 2011).
113 CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 112, at 1000 (one paragraph explaining the use of 
nondeterminative life expectancy tables or worklife tables to establish the period over 
which the plaintiff will experience diminished capacity and giving an example of a typical 
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Five casebooks only touch on the specific issue of race- and gender-based 
statistics in future damages calculations.114 Their discussions are usually 
limited to a few sentences but acknowledge potential controversy surrounding 
nonblended life and worklife expectancy tables and refer to the critical 
response of scholars such as Martha Chamallas, Jennifer Wriggins, and 
others.115 Despite their brevity, shorter treatments can convey significant 
                                                                                                                     
jury instruction on this point); 3 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 112, at 23–24 (one paragraph 
explaining that life expectancy and worklife tables used as baselines for fixing loss periods 
“may cause controversy because of different statistical expectancies by race and gender”); 
EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 112, at 857–58 (one page noting increasing scrutiny 
toward worklife expectancy calculations); id. at 858–59 (one page reporting judicial 
responses to race- and gender-based statistics in McMillan v. City of New York, 253 
F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), and CA 100064/02 Migdal Ins. Co. v. Abu-Hana (3) TakSC 
3932 (2005) (Isr.)); id. at 859 (one paragraph referencing the Special Master of the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund’s use of the tables based on white males for all 
victims of the disaster); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 112, at 478 (two paragraphs 
questioning whether the use of race- or gender-specific statistics violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, or, even if not, whether courts should adjust for biases in statistics); 
HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 112, at 558–71 (several pages explaining the difference 
between actual loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity using cases and life and 
worklife expectancy tables, and examining the challenges of calculating lost earning 
capacity for women and the young); LAYCOCK ET AL., supra note 112, at 211 (one 
paragraph noting that gender- and race-based data are often introduced in tort trials, 
without objections); id. at 211–12 (one paragraph commenting on the insurance industry, 
where race-based premiums and benefits were generally abandoned but gender-based 
premiums and benefits persist); LEVINE ET AL., supra note 112, at 528–35 (four pages 
analyzing Walker v. Ritchie, 2003 CarswellOnt 10 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.) (WL), in which 
a Canadian court decided whether the use of gender-neutral statistics for a female plaintiff 
would be erroneous); id. at 531–33 (two pages contrasting the approach of Canadian courts 
with American courts in determining lost earning capacity: one court decided to use 
gender-based wages, Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 398 (D.R.I. 1975); two 
lined up with Walker, 2003 CarswellOnt 10, United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 
1126 (10th Cir. 2007), and Wheeler Tarpeh–Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 455 
(D.D.C. 1991); and one reversed appellate court instructions to base a child’s lost earning 
capacity on “some type of average income for persons [in] the community,” Greyhound 
Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269, 1276 (Miss. 2000) (en banc) (quoting the court 
below)); id. at 534–35 (three paragraphs reviewing Judge Weinstein’s reasoning in 
McMillan, 253 F.R.D. 247); TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 112, at 668 (two 
paragraphs discussing various difficulties calculating future damages, especially for young 
female plaintiffs).
114 See CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 112, at 1000, 1007; 3 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 
112, at 23–24; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 112, at 478; LAYCOCK ET AL., supra note 112,
at 211–12; TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 112, at 667–68.
115 See CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 112, at 1007 (citing CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS,
supra note 107); EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 112, at 857–58 (reproducing a portion of 
an argument from Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort 
Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 481–83 (1998)); HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 112, at 571 
(citing Greenberg, supra note 107); LEVINE ET AL., supra note 112, at 534 (first citing 
August McCarthy, The Lost Futures of Lead-Poisoned Children: Race-Based Damage 
Awards and the Limits of Constitutionality, 14 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 75 (2004); then 
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tension: in a two-paragraph note, John C.P. Goldberg and coauthors question 
the constitutionality of race- and gender-differentiated damages when they 
reproduce the effects of past discrimination.116 Douglas Laycock and 
coauthors remind students that federal employment discrimination laws forbid 
gender-based disparities in employer-sponsored insurance, while race- and 
gender-based data are still routinely introduced in tort trials without 
objection.117
Three casebooks expand on this discussion, dedicating pages rather than 
paragraphs to examining the problem.118 James A. Henderson, Jr. and 
coauthors describe the variables involved in determining lost earning capacity 
damages and identify the statistical tables and factors that are taken into 
account.119 Richard A. Epstein and Catherine M. Sharkey share a portion of 
Chamallas’s argument against the use of historical tables and present three 
examples of instances when race- and gender-based statistics were rejected as 
providing the basis for determining damages.120 David I. Levine and coauthors 
use the Canadian case Walker v. Ritchie—in which the Canadian court decided 
to allow the use of gender-neutral earnings tables—to compare and contrast 
the reasoning in various American cases dealing with race- or gender-based 
tables.121
This review of casebook notes on the discriminatory effects of race- and
gender-based statistical tables leads us to conclude that today’s students are 
not sufficiently educated about the fairness, efficiency, and constitutional 
problems presented by race- and gender-based damages awards or the perverse 
targeting incentives that may be generated by their use in future damages 
calculations. 
III. THE EXISTENCE OF PERVERSE EX ANTE INCENTIVES
The previous Part established the discriminatory practice of courts and 
legislatures and the lack of sufficient purposeful attention from academia to 
such practice. The PhedEx example at the beginning of this Article 
                                                                                                                     
citing Chamallas, supra note 108; and then citing Martha F. Davis, Valuing Women: A 
Case Study, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 219 (2002)); TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 
112, at 668 (first citing Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and 
Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 75 (1994); and then citing Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of 
Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1281 (2004)).
116 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 112, at 478.
117 LAYCOCK ET AL., supra note 112, at 211–12.
118 See EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 112, at 857–59; HENDERSON ET AL., supra
note 112, at 558–71; LEVINE ET AL., supra note 112, at 528–35.
119 HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 112, at 558–71.
120 EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 112, at 858–59 (discussing McMillan v. City of 
New York, 253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); CA 100064/02 Migdal Ins. Co. v. Abu-Hana 
(3) TakSC 3932 (2005) (Isr.); and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund).
121 See LEVINE ET AL., supra note 112, at 528–35.
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demonstrated the perverse ex ante targeting incentives this practice creates.122
But how plausible is it that such incentives actually operate on the ground? Do 
potential tortfeasors really calculate their conduct based on damages tables, or 
is this issue just an academic exercise? In this Part we discuss some examples 
of real-life situations. 
A. Some Real-Life Examples
The theoretical examples play out in a multitude of contexts. But does any 
real evidence show that companies are actually making these calculations? To 
begin with, consider the leaked 2005 Wal-Mart memo highlighting the 
company’s strategic consideration of costs associated with certain 
demographics.123 Among other things, the memo proposed discouraging 
unhealthy people from working at Wal-Mart.124 It encouraged Wal-Mart to 
ensure that “all jobs [would] include some physical activity (e.g., all cashiers 
do some cart-gathering)” to dissuade unhealthy individuals from seeking open 
positions.125 The memo further stated, “[i]t will be far easier to attract and 
retain a healthier work force than it will be to change behavior in an existing 
one . . . . These moves would also dissuade unhealthy people from coming to 
work at Wal-Mart.”126 Quite simply, the memo demonstrated a rational actor’s
assessment of the high healthcare costs of obese workers—and the negative 
effects of those costs on Wal-Mart’s bottom line—without caring about the 
consequences of such calculations for the workers themselves. 
Still, the Wal-Mart memo did not propose to injure anyone to improve the 
company’s bottom line, only to ignore the impact of its policy on potential 
employees. Indeed, finding memos that would prove a targeting intent is 
extremely hard. And yet, consider the leaked 1991 World Bank memo which 
indicates that companies might well attempt to minimize their liability costs by 
targeting low-income victims.127 Lawrence Summers, the organization’s then-
chief economist (and later president of Harvard University) wrote: 
Just between you and me, shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging MORE 
migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs [Less Developed 
Countries]? . . .
                                                                                                                     
122 See supra Part I.
123 Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Memo Suggests Ways to Cut 




125 Id. (quoting Memorandum from M. Susan Chambers, Exec. Vice President for 
Benefits, Wal-Mart).
126 Id. (quoting Memorandum from M. Susan Chambers, Exec. Vice President for 
Benefits, Wal-Mart).
127 Lawrence Summers: The Bank Memo, WHIRLED BANK GROUP, http://www.whirled
bank.org/ourwords/summers.html [https://perma.cc/RDN8-XMFE].
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. . . The measurements of the costs of health impairing pollution depends [sic] 
on the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this 
point of view a given amount of health impairing pollution should be done in 
the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest 
wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in 
the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.128
Without similar “smoking-gun” memos it is hard to prove discriminatory 
intent, and we are therefore left with demonstrating something akin to 
disparate impact. 
One may wonder whether bad publicity, boycotts, and adherence to social 
norms more generally might prevent such targeting; yet for now, it continues. 
In the remainder of this Part, we discuss three important areas in which 
sufficient empirical evidence documents real-life race- or gender-based 
disparity—evidence that raises the specter of forbidden discrimination. 
1. Lead-Based Paint
We start with the potential targeting undertaken by landlords as a means of 
managing the toxic effects of lead-based paints. In 1991, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) identified lead-based paint as “the 
most common and societally devastating environmental disease of young 
children.”129 Lead poisoning from lead-based paints can cause learning 
disabilities and lead to serious behavioral problems.130 Children are at the 
greatest risk of lead poisoning because they tend to be exposed to more lead 
than adults and their lead absorption rates are higher.131 The unborn are also at 
risk: lead can pass from the woman to her fetus through the placenta.132 Since 
low-income, minority families are more likely to occupy older homes with 
lead-based paint, the majority of children poisoned by lead in the United States
are poor African-American and Latino children.133
Accordingly, investors who buy an old property have diluted incentives to 
renovate the apartments in a way that will encapsulate the lead paint.134 And 
that, unfortunately, is exactly what happened in the 2015 case of G.M.M. ex 
rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson.135 There, Judge Weinstein cited scholars 
                                                                                                                     
128 Id. (quoting Memorandum from Lawrence H. Summers, Chief Economist, World 
Bank, to Distribution, World Bank (Dec. 12, 1991)).
129 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STRATEGIC 
PLAN FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING xi (Feb. 1991).
130 Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, The Lead Poisoning Challenge: An Approach for 
California and Other States, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 387, 390–91 (1997).
131 Id. at 390.
132 Id.
133 See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 107, at 138–53.
134 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
135 G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez–Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015).
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who identified the perverse incentives behind landlords’ motivation to clean 
up the toxic hazards in neighborhoods most affected by lead-based paint: 
because it is cheaper to injure poor and minority children, landlords have 
lesser incentives to remove lead-based paint from deteriorating homes in those 
communities.136 The underlying reason is a familiar one: because most of the 
victims of lead-based paint poisoning are children, and given the lack of 
individualized evidence that indicates what career path particular children 
would have taken and how much they would have earned absent the negative 
interference, courts rely on statistics from nonblended tables that provide 
considerably lower awards for black and Hispanic defendants than for 
comparable white victims.137 Judge Weinstein summarized the effect of these 
incentives: the use of race-based statistics ensures that “lead poisoned children 
will continue to be ‘inadequately compensated’ for their present and 
future.”138
2. Healthcare
Numerous studies and scholarly articles confirm that minorities across the 
United States receive inferior healthcare treatment.139 For example, a Harvard 
                                                                                                                     
136 Id. at 143 (“[B]ecause it is cheaper to injure poor minority children, there is less 
incentive for defendants to take measures to clean up toxic hazards in the neighborhoods 
most affected by lead paint.” (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Chamallas, supra note 106, at 1441)); see also id. at 141 (“[W]hen damages for injuring 
members of minority groups are lowered, the legal regimen [has] the perverse result of 
encouraging torts against them.” (alterations in original) (quoting Meyerson & Meyerson, 
supra note 106, at 808)).
137 Chamallas, supra note 106, at 1440–41.
138 Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (quoting Greenberg, supra note 107, at 457).
139 E.g., Amber E. Barnato et al., Hospital-Level Racial Disparities in Acute 
Myocardial Infarction Treatment and Outcomes, 43 MED. CARE 308, 308 (2005) (“These 
findings indicate that, on average, blacks went to hospitals that had lower rates of 
evidence-based medical treatments, higher rates of cardiac procedures, and worse risk-
adjusted mortality after AMI.”); Jerry Cromwell et al., Race/Ethnic Disparities in 
Utilization of Lifesaving Technologies by Medicare Ischemic Heart Disease Beneficiaries,
43 MED. CARE 330, 330 (2005) (“Despite having similar Medicare health insurance 
coverage, elderly utilization and IHD mortality rates differ markedly not only between 
whites and minorities, but within minority groups themselves.”); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Racial 
Disparities in Health Care and Cultural Competency, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 75, 76 (2003) 
(“A close look at the health care industry’s institutional practices reveals an English-only, 
ethnocentric, racist culture that does interfere with patient care.”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, 
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Medicare: What the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Can, and Should, Do, 9 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 667, 668–72 (2005) (noting that there is a disparity in the 
quality of treatment that black Medicare patients receive compared to white Medicare 
patients, and pointing out “what those who administer the Medicare program can do to 
address [this]”); Sidney D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and 
Incentives, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 206 (2001) (“[H]ealth care professionals provide 
different—and generally less—care to their minority patients. When hospitalized, African-
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study conducted for the City of New York documented higher numbers of 
adverse actions caused by negligence in hospitals serving minority 
communities.140 Another study conducted by the Institute of Medicine 
provided similar results.141
Whereas the reason for this disparity is not understood fully, it could be 
related to the lower liability risks that minorities present. In the event of a 
medical malpractice suit involving a minority or female plaintiff, healthcare 
providers would be required to pay lower damages than they would have been 
had a white male plaintiff brought the suit.142 Additionally, caps on 
                                                                                                                     
Americans receive fewer surgical interventions, diagnostic tests, medical services, and less 
optimal interventions than whites—even when their diagnosis, symptoms, and source of 
payment are the same.”); Michael Foster, Don’t Sacrifice the Tort System on the Altar of 
Health Care Reform, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1994, at 22, 27 (“[E]ven among insured patients, those 
who are black or from poor neighborhoods receive worse care.”); see also Racial 
Disparities in Health Care: Confronting Unequal Treatment: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t 
Reform, 107th Cong. 6–7 (2003) (statement of Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, Member, H. 
Comm. on Gov’t Reform) (discussing the IOM study’s findings of racial disparity in health 
care treatment, and stating that witnesses would “address a range of . . . initiatives that 
must be undertaken if we were to achieve . . . the Nation’s goal, of ending racial disparities 
in health care”). But see Darrell J. Gaskin et al., Do Hospitals Provide Lower-Quality Care 
to Minorities than to Whites?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 518, 526 (2008) (suggesting that “when 
minority patients receive hospital care, they receive the same standard of care that white 
patients receive” and, therefore, the focus should be on “eliminating disparities in quality 
across hospitals rather than within hospitals” (emphasis added)).
140 The study analyzed different possible risk factors associated with suffering from an 
“adverse event” (injuries resulting from medical interventions) and found that “blacks had 
a higher standardized rate of [adverse events] over all [sic] and [adverse events] resulting 
from negligence.” HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK
6-2 (1990); see also Joanne Doroshow & Amy Widman, The Racial Implications of Tort 
Reform, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 161, 162–63 (2007) (discussing the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study and the larger implications of tort reform on minorities). Although the study 
found that these differences overall were not significant, it did note that higher rates of 
adverse events resulting from negligent events were found in hospitals that served a higher 
proportion of minority patients. HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, supra, at 6-2.
141 A 2002 study was conducted at the request of Congress to “assess the extent of 
racial and ethnic differences in the quality of health care received by patients, not 
attributable to . . . factors such as access to care, ability to pay, or insurance coverage.” 
Alan Nelson, Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health 
Care, 94 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 666, 666 (2002). The study found that “[r]acial and ethnic 
disparities in health care exist even when insurance status, income, age, and severity of 
conditions are comparable.” Id. (highlighting the key findings from the study presented in 
INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN 
HEALTHCARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003)).
142 This is because minorities on average make less money than white individuals, 
affecting their economic damages (which are calculated by using race- and gender-specific 
data that “project[] that white men are worth more economically than women or 
minorities”). Edwards, supra note 104, at 220.
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noneconomic damages in medical malpractice suits, which most states have 
enacted,143 further exacerbate this effect. Minorities and females are less likely 
to receive a high amount of economic damages for their future-loss-of-income 
calculations because their income is usually lower.144 Before caps on 
noneconomic damages were instituted, the pain and suffering component of 
noneconomic damages could, and often did, make up for the lower amount 
received through economic damages—but that is no longer the case.145 The 
caps on noneconomic damages greatly limit the overall recoveries of women 
and minorities, thus making it less likely for them to find a lawyer who will 
take on their case at all, as lawyers in that field work on a contingency fee 
basis.146 The result is that women and minorities pose a significantly lower 
liability risk than men and whites, which might explain why the former 
collectives receive inferior care. 
3. Pollution
Pollution is another area where disparity exists on the ground. Extensive 
literature highlights the relationship between high-polluting entities and low-
income communities. Scholars and scientists generally concur regarding the 
existence of a disproportionate allocation of environmental hazards, pollution, 
and locally undesirable land uses (LULUs) in poorer minority communities.147
Recent studies confirm this consensus.148
While the literature on environmental injustice documents this correlation 
between the locations of disadvantaged towns or neighborhoods and industrial 
activities, evidence demonstrating “causation” was once less prevalent. It was 
conjectured that the correlation was attributable to disadvantaged groups’
choices to live near industries due to the other benefits they receive, such as 
lower property prices and proximity to work.149 However, the limited research 
into this issue calls into question the likelihood of such a choice/convenience 
model.150
                                                                                                                     
143 See id. at 221.
144 See id. at 220.
145 See id. at 219–20.
146 Id. at 219.
147 Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to 
Environmental Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 497–98 (1997)
(“Although there was a delayed acknowledgment of the disproportionate allocation of 
environmental burdens, there is presently a strong consensus that, in the United 
States, . . . the burdens associated with the national effort to control pollution fall on those 
who are poor or politically weak.” (footnote omitted)).
148 See infra note 150.
149 See Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 80–81 
(1996).
150 The most recent study, published in November 2015, concludes that racial 
discrimination best explains present-day disparate siting of polluting industrial facilities. 
Mohai & Saha, supra note 8, at 15–16. But see Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the 
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Recall the Larry Summers leaked memo.151 There is no reason to assume 
that similar calculations are not being made regarding domestic legal liability. 
While domestic environmental regulation aims to protect poor or minority 
neighborhoods, when companies do violate environmental laws or regulations 
in these neighborhoods they will most likely not have to suffer severe 
consequences (if any at all), due to the lack of political power of the residents 
to pursue legal action. Among other factors, this weakness stems from the 
difficulty residents of such neighborhoods face in attaining adequate legal 
representation, since their expected recovery is low.152 Therefore, the outcome 
of a 2004 study that found the risk of accidents for chemical facilities in 
heavily African-American counties to be twice as high as the risk in other 
counties is not surprising.153
The incentives to target blacks do not elude local governments. A history 
of legislative bodies targeting black communities and families for hazardous 
waste dumps has been documented.154 In one notable example, the State of 
North Carolina dumped toxic waste in Warren County, targeting an area that 
was not scientifically suitable for containing such waste but was populated 
mostly by black, poor, rural, and politically powerless families whose historic 
protests had had little effect on state authorities.155 In theory, the citizens of 
Warren County—individuals living in poverty—could have chosen to pack up 
and move away following state targeting; but this could hardly be 
characterized as a real choice.
Though the Warren County case involved a black-majority community, 
many black families living near environmental hazards have been treated by 
legislative bodies in a way that their comparable white counterparts have not, 
showing a race-dependent concern for liability on a more granular level. For 
example, in Dickson County, Tennessee, a state-authorized landfill 
contaminated the wells of both African-American and white families.156
                                                                                                                     
Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice 
Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 34 (1997) (suggesting that siting processes do not 
intentionally or unintentionally target neighborhoods with high percentages of people with 
incomes below the poverty level).
151 See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
152 See Edwards, supra note 104, at 219.
153 M.R. Elliott et al., Environmental Justice: Frequency and Severity of U.S. Chemical 
Industry Accidents and the Socioeconomic Status of Surrounding Communities, 58 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 24, 24 (2004).
154 See generally Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Wright, Disastrous Response to Natural 
and Man-Made Disasters: An Environmental Justice Analysis Twenty-Five Years After 
Warren County, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 217 (2008).
155 Id. at 223–24. Only in 2003 did the citizens of Warren County receive redress for 
the hastily planned 142-acre toxic dump in their backyards with the completion of efforts 
by state and federal sources, costing $18 million, to detoxify or neutralize contaminated 
soil stored in Warren County since 1982. Id. at 221.
156 See id. at 236.
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However, the treatment of the two groups was markedly different.157 For one, 
testing and monitoring of the black families’ wells differed from the treatment 
of those of white families: the state government did not even include the black 
families’ water wells in a water toxicity study.158 Indeed, the government’s
heightened concern for the liability imposed by white families versus 
comparable black families played out in public: the Dickson County 
Commissioners voted unanimously to settle lawsuits with several white 
families that alleged groundwater leaks and ignored the sole black family to 
file against such leaks.159
In sum, both theory and empirical evidence suggest that at least to some 
extent, perverse ex ante incentives exist. The next Part of this Article engages 
the various theories of tort law. We scrutinize race- and gender-based 
statistical tables from within. We explore such use from a distributive justice 
perspective in Part A, from a corrective justice perspective in Part B, and from 
a law and economics perspective in Part C. 
IV. THE VARIOUS OBJECTIVES OF TORT LAW AS A REASON FOR BIAS
We have established that courts in the United States overwhelmingly use 
nonblended tables.160 Does this practice stem from an incorrect application of 
tort doctrine, or is it something intrinsic to tort theory? To answer this 
question, this Part discusses the theoretical foundations of tort law.
In the first two Parts that follow, we very briefly demonstrate how 
corrective justice and distributive justice theories of tort law can accommodate 
the use of blended race- and gender-based statistical tables. A full discussion 
of corrective justice and distributive justice in the context of discrimination, 
however, lies beyond the scope of this Article.
In the third Part, we first show that conventional economic analysis of law 
suggests that targeting the disadvantaged is socially desirable. We then offer 
several potential alternatives to the economic analysis perspective and 
endeavor to demonstrate that, far from socially desirable, the use of blended
tables is, in fact, necessary to legal economists’ pursuit of optimal deterrence. 
A. The Distributive Justice Perspective
Distributive justice theorists are often pluralists who adopt more than one 
rationale for the justification of tort law.161 They frequently acknowledge both 
                                                                                                                     
157 Id. at 236–37. 
158 Id. at 237–40. 
159 Id. at 236.
160 See supra Part II.A.
161 See, e.g., IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 2 (1993); ARIEL PORAT 
& ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 12 (2001); Ronen Avraham & Issa 
Kohler-Hausmann, Accident Law for Egalitarians, 12 LEGAL THEORY 181, 217 (2006) 
(“Our intuitions about fairness in compensation for misfortunes and liability for careless 
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corrective justice and law and economics rationales, while also reasoning that 
social good can, and should, arise from tort law’s distributive capabilities.162
We discuss the distributive justice rationale of tort law only very briefly 
because it seems most natural for its subscribers to readily adopt the use of 
blended tables in the calculation of tort damages awards, as the distributive 
benefits of such tables are clear. 
In short, distributive justice rationales in tort law can be conceptualized as 
one rationale based on three primary theories: “loss spreading,”163
“fairness,”164 and “egalitarianism.”165 First, loss-spreading reasons that “all 
things being equal, accident losses should be spread across many bearers”
because small, predictable losses hurt less than abrupt losses that are
considerable and unpredictable.166 Loss-spreading is supported by Calabresi’s
reasoning that tort law should not only reduce primary accident costs—the 
absolute loss caused by the accident—but also seek to reduce secondary 
accident costs—which are the negative effects of those costs on the individuals 
required to bear them.167 And since the negative effects are greater for 
individuals belonging to disadvantaged groups, policymakers should be 
concerned not only with the extent of accident costs and the number of bearers 
of these costs, but also with whether their bearers belong to advantaged or 
disadvantaged groups. 
Second, distributive justice theorists believe that fairness is a crucial 
consideration in tort law.168 From this perspective, “the distributive effects of a 
legal rule, including the effects on third parties are relevant” in judging “the 
rule’s desirability.”169 Gregory Keating, for example, adopts the view that tort 
                                                                                                                     
actions are best captured when we integrate insights of both [restorative justice] and 
[distributive justice] in theorizing what justice demands in liability for risks and 
compensation for harms.”); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict 
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1083–84 (1972); Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. 
Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 593–94 (1985); Tsachi 
Keren-Paz, Egalitarianism as Justification: Why and How Should Egalitarian 
Considerations Reshape the Standard of Care in Negligence Law?, 4 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 275, 278–79 (2003) (drawing on insights from egalitarianism, corrective 
justice, economic analysis, loss-spreading, and fairness perspectives); Gary T. Schwartz, 
Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1801, 1801 (1997).
162 See sources cited supra note 161.
163 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39–45 (1970). Though Calabresi 
discusses “loss spreading” in the context of efficiency, namely as it relates to 
overdeterrence, see id., the consideration has an undeniable justice element as well. 
164 Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of 
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 219–21 (2000).
165 Keren-Paz, supra note 161, at 277; see also Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Corrective 
Justice, Substantive Equality and Tort Law, in TORT THEORY, supra note 104, at 48, 48.
166 Keren-Paz, supra note 161, at 283.
167 CALABRESI, supra note 163, at 26–27.
168 See Keating, supra note 164, at 194–95.
169 Keren-Paz, supra note 161, at 284 (emphasis omitted).
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law is a matter of the fair apportionment of the burdens and benefits of 
mutually beneficial but risky activities.170 This perspective contradicts that of 
corrective justice theorists, who argue that tort law is a matter of wrongdoing 
and redress.171 Fairness only factors into the corrective justice approach 
indirectly, if at all. Under the distributive justice approach, fairness is the 
distributive criterion.172 Thus, fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of 
risky activities occurs when those who reap the benefits of activities also bear 
their burdens, even if no wrongdoing was involved. Under this approach, the 
costs of nonnegligent accidents are not to be borne exclusively by the 
unfortunate victims, and the costs of negligent accidents are not left 
exclusively to the unfortunate doers whose wrongdoing causes injury.173
Finally, some distributive justice theorists support a third theory of tort 
law, namely egalitarianism.174 Proponents of an egalitarian regime hold that 
the standard of care individuals owe depends on the extent of their social 
advantage: the rich should take more care than the poor.175 Whereas Keating’s
conception of fairness ignores parties’ relative socioeconomic conditions, the 
egalitarian approach does not.176
Each of the three primary rationales adopted by distributive justice 
theorists supports the ability to reduce the discriminatory effects of tort law by 
requiring the use of blended tables.177 First, proponents of a loss-spreading 
                                                                                                                     
170 Id. at 285.
171 See Keating, supra note 164, at 194–95.
172 See also Avraham & Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 161, at 181 (“[T]he theory of 
corrective justice, along with its institutional embodiment of tort law, is at odds with an 
egalitarian commitment to fairness because it allows luck an unjustifiable role in 
determining dissimilar liability for similar wrongs and dissimilar compensation for similar 
losses to bodily integrity.”). 
173 See id. at 217–19 (“[O]nce someone is negligent, she should bear liability even if 
the damage is remote (as in Palsgraf [v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 
1928)]), if it is not clear that the negligent act caused the damage at all (as in Summers [v. 
Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (in bank)]), if it is clear that it did not (as in Hymowitz [v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y 1989)]), or if the defendant cannot disprove her 
causation of harm (as in Sindell [v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980)]).”); see 
also Keating, supra note 164, at 202. 
174 E.g., Avraham & Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 161, at 184–85; Ken Cooper-
Stephenson, Economic Analysis, Substantive Equality and Tort Law, in TORT THEORY,
supra note 104, at 131; Tsachi Keren-Paz, An Inquiry into the Merits of Redistribution 
Through Tort Law: Rejecting the Claim of Randomness, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 91, 91–92 
(2003); Tsachi Keren-Paz, The Limits of Private Law: Tort Law and Distributive Justice 
iv–v (Dec. 2000) (unpublished J.D. thesis, York University) (on file with the National 
Library of Canada).
175 Keren-Paz argues that since “[f]indings of negligence are based on the failure to 
balance properly between one’s own interests and those of another,” a morally relevant 
criterion for determining the extent to which defendants should burden themselves “in 
order to prevent a loss to potential victims . . . is the parties’ relative abilities to bear 
precaution costs and expected accident loss.” Keren-Paz, supra note 161, at 278.
176 See id. at 285.
177 See supra Parts II, III.
2017] TORTS AND DISCRIMINATION 695
theory should welcome the use of blended tables. Because targeting exposes 
disadvantaged populations to a substantially greater ex ante probability of 
actual injury or death,178 nonblended tables cause the costs of accidents to be 
misallocated, increasing the secondary accident costs. Next, distributive justice 
theorists adopting a fairness rationale would be inherently inclined to support 
the adoption of blended tables in the calculation of tort damages. Because the 
use of nonblended tables imposes a risk that some parties will be 
undercompensated (for example, those women and blacks who succeeded 
beyond what was predicted by the tables),179 fairness requires that this risk be 
equally distributed among all demographics. Finally, distributive justice 
theorists adopting an egalitarian perspective should be equally welcoming of 
the mandated use of blended tables in the calculation of tort damages, as such 
tables provide no unfavorable incentives to target the worseoff.180
B. The Corrective Justice Perspective
As with distributive justice, there is no single theory of corrective justice; 
yet some common threads prevail. As Ernest Weinrib puts it, corrective justice 
is the idea that imposing liability on one who injures another rectifies the 
injustice inflicted.181 According to corrective justice, tort law requires the 
defendant to provide some ex post justice to redress the harm she has caused—
and only the harm she has caused—to the plaintiff.182 This perspective has 
sheltered prominent corrective justice theorists and the courts from any 
obligation to argue against the inclusion of racial and gender characteristics in 
the calculation of damages awards.183 Because corrective justice is about 
justice between the parties themselves, and not in society at large, social 
problems such as race or gender discrimination simply do not comprise part of 
the corrective apparatus.184
We argue the time has come for corrective justice theorists to engage with 
the inconvenient truth of race and gender inequity and allow for the possibility 
that the corrective justice rationale actually embraces notions of 
antidiscrimination. There are two ways to arrive at this conclusion. First, one 
can observe that tort doctrine has often aspired to compensate the victim not 
for loss of income, but rather for loss of income capacity.185 Viewed this way, 
it is easier to see why a white boy and a black girl should receive the same 
compensation for similar injuries. Their income capacity should be identified, 
as a normative matter, as being equal. Their life story is yet to be written, and 
                                                                                                                     
178 See supra Part III.
179 See supra Part II.
180 See supra Part III.
181 Weinrib, supra note 22, at 349.
182 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 112, at 19–20; see also Rivlin, supra note 24, at 23.
183 See, e.g., Rivlin, supra note 24, at 23.
184 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 112, at 20.
185 See Rivlin, supra note 24, at 22.
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their stories should be given an equal chance.186 This reading helps to justify 
the incorporation of antidiscrimination objectives into the calculation of 
damages for lost wages, which includes estimations of both future salary and 
future worklife years.187 A similar conception might help remove 
discrimination from other damages components, such as future medical costs 
and future pain and suffering, where life expectancy tables are relevant.188
The second approach to broadening the perspective taken by corrective 
justice is to read basic human rights into its framework. The Israeli Supreme 
Court used this notion of corrective justice as part of its rationale in holding 
that race- and gender-neutral statistics were needed to calculate an Arab girl’s
loss of earning potential.189 One justice deemed the rationale a “new reading 
of corrective justice which embraces fundamental values and universal 
creeds.”190 Under this conception of corrective justice, race- and gender-
blended statistics are not in conflict with the goals of tort law.191 However, 
even the Israeli case only dealt with wage tables, not life expectancy or 
worklife tables.192
A further, related way to enable corrective justice to find a realistic level 
of engagement with this issue might also exist. One would need to ponder on 
how victims’ right to rectification in a constitutional democracy—a system of 
many rights—impacts the operation of tort law. The argument, in short, is that 
within a constitutional democracy, the manner in which the common law 
carries out its corrective justice aims will be influenced by constitutional 
norms.193 A tortfeasor who harms a victim may not later redress the victim 
outside the scope of the victim’s constitutional rights.194 As tort law has long 
recognized, the eggshell skull rule requires tortfeasors to take their victim as 
they find them physically.195 Within a constitutional democracy, one can 
argue, the tortfeasor must also take victims within the scope of their 
constitutional rights.196 If the constitutional norms are such that an individual 
may not be subjected to discrimination on the basis of gender and race, then 
corrective justice theorists must bend to those constitutional norms as well. 
                                                                                                                     
186 See id. at 26.
187 See id.
188 See id. at 23 & n.112.
189 Id. at 22–23 (discussing CA 100064/02 Migdal Ins. Co. v. Abu-Hana (3) TakSC 
3932 (2005) (Isr.)).
190 Id. at 23.
191 See Rivlin, supra note 24, at 23.
192 Id. at 22–23.
193 See Keren-Paz, supra note 161, at 295–96.
194 See Weinrib, supra note 22, at 352–54.
195 John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full 
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 466–67 (2006).
196 See Weinrib, supra note 22, at 352–54.
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The scope of this Article prevents us from further developing here these 
ideas or others;197 we now turn to the economic analysis of law perspective. 
C. The Economic Analysis Perspective 
As demonstrated earlier, the use of race- and gender-based statistics 
incentivizes potential tortfeasors to direct dangerous behavior toward certain 
groups.198 But is this behavior efficient?
In this Part we explain why a conventional economic analysis of law 
supports targeting the disadvantaged under the current tort law regime. We 
then argue once again for a much-needed shift in thinking within the economic
analysis of law and suggest alternative approaches to achieve this shift. 
1. The Theory: Why Economic Analysis of Law Supports Targeting
As identified in the examples presented above, the current structure of tort 
law incentivizes potential tortfeasors to target disadvantaged groups. On its 
surface, this targeting seems to be efficient. The optimal deterrence model uses 
tort law to induce companies to engage in behavior that minimizes the costs of 
precautions and the costs of harm from accidents not prevented.199 Generally, 
the resulting effect on companies’ choices is positive: tort law incentivizes 
optimal caretaking, product safety testing, and other socially beneficial 
solutions that seek to avoid excessive accident costs.200 However, tort law also 
achieves all of that by leading rational companies to choose among 
alternatives by determining which has the lowest potential private liability 
costs.201 If race and gender are accounted for when calculating damages, 
companies will target the “cheapest” race and gender—blacks and women, 
respectively.202 Recall the PhedEx example.203 The manager does not have to 
be a bigot to make that managerial decision; suffice it that she follow the 
economic incentives tort law provides, whereby it is less costly to have 
accidents involving blacks than accidents involving whites. 
Even if courts apply the same standard of care when determining 
negligence absent consideration of the potential victim’s race or gender, the 
targeting incentive remains. For example, implementing a universal speed 
limit across all areas—regardless of whether it is predominantly black or 
white—will not eliminate the targeting incentives. It is the structure of the 
                                                                                                                     
197 Another possible approach is to build on the distinction between “full 
compensation” and “fair compensation.” E.g., Goldberg, supra note 195, at 437–38
(emphasis omitted).
198 See supra Part III. 
199 See CALABRESI, supra note 163, at 26–27.
200 See id. at 244–46.
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 See supra Part I.
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compensation scheme that encourages rational actors to disproportionately 
allocate harm among the least costly race or gender group.204
And such targeting, the economic argument goes, is efficient.205 After all, 
if some types of victims systematically receive lower damages in courts, why 
should tortfeasors not target them? Surely, doing so will save (private) costs to 
the tortfeasors? Does it not save costs to society at large as well? 
Indeed, from a law and economics perspective we must ask whether 
targeting the disadvantaged reduces social costs and not merely private 
costs.206 Many legal economists will perceive the higher liability costs as 
reflective of the higher value society places on high-income earners due to 
their higher productivity.207 For those legal economists, the private costs 
tortfeasors save reflect savings in social costs as well.208 Therefore, according 
to this view, targeting is efficient.209
To better illustrate this perspective, let us start with an example. Suppose 
we seek to know how much members of different groups would be willing to 
invest in their members’ safety. Individuals in an advantaged group have been 
found to be willing to invest more in safety than individuals in a disadvantaged 
group.210 Why? Because all else being equal, their future loss of income is 
higher, and therefore higher investments in precautions are cost-justified.211
Consider the following school bus example. Imagine you are the manager 
of a school bus company that serves private schools. Your company serves 
only two types of institution: all-white boys’ schools and all-black girls’
schools. You need to decide how to assign buses and drivers to the two 
schools your company serves. The company has modern, safer buses, as well 
as older, less safe buses. It employs very good, experienced drivers, as well as 
not-so-good, inexperienced ones.
Let’s assume that the children are identical in every way except for their 
statistically predicted future incomes, which differ. Assume that their non-
income-related losses (medical costs, pain and suffering, etc.) are equivalent at 
                                                                                                                     
204 Adjin-Tettey recognizes this distortion in incentives, stating:
The current system creates and reinforces the relative worth of human life and 
potential. It gives the impression that persons with favourable personal traits and/or 
socio-economic backgrounds are worth more than others, making it cheaper to injure 
persons in the latter category. This undermines one of the central aims of tort law, that 
is, to create disincentives or deterrence for wrongdoing.
Adjin-Tettey, supra note 106, at 344 (emphasis added); see also Ariel Porat, 
Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 86–87 (2011) (discussing a similar 
misalignment in tort law in the context of wealth). 
205 Porat, supra note 204, at 101–02.
206 Id.
207 Adjin-Tettey, supra note 106, at 344–45; see also Porat, supra note 204, at 86–87.
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$1,000,000, but their future loss of income is determined to be $1,000,000 and 
$500,000 for the white boys and the black girls, respectively. Suppose their 
baseline risk of getting injured with a regular driver is 0.3%. They are now 
offered a better driver that will reduce their risk of injury to 0.2%. How much 
would they each rationally be willing to pay to switch? A white boy will pay 
up to $2,000. Why? Because this is his expected benefit from reducing the 
risk. Switching drivers reduces the risk by 0.1% (0.3%–0.2%), and when we 
multiply this by his expected total loss of $2,000,000, we get $2,000. Similar 
calculations will lead us to conclude that a black girl, in contrast, will pay up 
to $1,500, because this is her expected benefit from the better driver. Thus, 
measured by their willingness-to-pay, the children (or their benevolent agent) 
rationally will be willing to invest a different amount in safety, merely because 
their future loss of income projection is different.212
Courts, so goes the argument, should not incentivize tortfeasors to invest 
in precautions more than the potential victims themselves would have been 
willing to invest.213 That would be paternalistic and disrespectful of the 
victims’ preferences and autonomy, and, importantly, would not be welfare-
maximizing.214 Going back to our example, suppose that hiring a safer driver 
costs an extra $1,800. For the white boys, the costs are lower than the expected 
benefit and therefore on pure cost–benefit grounds, switching is beneficial. In 
contrast, the black girls will be better off if they choose not to switch. It is not 
worth it for them to spend $1,800 to save expected costs of $1,500. They will 
prefer to keep the risky driver and receive instead, say, $1,600 in cash. The 
cash will not allow them to get the better driver, but will more than 
compensate them for their expected loss, enabling them to also satisfy some 
other needs, thus improving their total welfare. 
In sum, a policy that mandates equal safety for both groups is Pareto-
inferior to a policy that incentivizes differential safety while distributing cash 
to the disadvantaged group.215 As Kaplow and Shavell, two of the most 
influential scholars writing about efficiency in the law, famously argued, tort 
law should be tuned to efficiency, and distribution to the disadvantaged groups 
should be undertaken through the tax and transfer system.216 This is roughly 
how an economic analysis of law would justify the current tort law regime and 
its targeting incentives. 
                                                                                                                     
212 Id. 
213 See id. at 104–05.
214 Porat, supra note 204, at 127; see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 178–79 (2004) (explaining that social welfare is optimized 
when the cost of care is equal to the reduction in expected accident losses).
215 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto 
Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 350 (2003).
216 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 677. See generally Louis Kaplow, On the 
(Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government Policy, 18 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 159 (2004) (making this claim).
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In what follows, we attempt to provide several possible outlets to save 
economic analysis of law from this embarrassment. Even when the outlets we 
provide are successful, they are not equally so. Nonetheless, we believe it is 
worthwhile to discuss both the strong and the weak outlets. 
2. Saving Law and Economics from Embarrassment
a. First Potential Outlet: Nonblended Tables Are Inherently Less 
Accurate than Blended Ones
While any attempt to quantify damages resulting from a tort is necessarily 
fraught with some degree of imprecision, a number of factors suggest that the 
use of life expectancy, worklife expectancy, and wage tables in determining 
tort damages presents special limitations when it comes to accuracy.217 For 
example, criticizing race-based tables specifically, in Kimpson, Judge 
Weinstein commented that the current tables ignore the resiliency of individual 
children who rise to the top of their potential from very adverse conditions (a 
perspective urged by Resiliency Theory).218 In McMillan v. City of New York,
Judge Weinstein criticized the use of race-based expectancy tables for ignoring 
the fact that many of the disparities disappear altogether when socioeconomic 
factors are controlled for.219 Yet in fact, the tables are plagued by even more 
fundamental statistical errors—errors that have avoided scrutiny from other 
commentators.220
There are three glaring issues with these tables. First, they are only based 
on a snapshot of the world as it was prior to their compilation, and thus ignore 
significant historical trends leading to convergence between the races and the 
genders. Second, they are imprecisely measured, generally providing only a 
single statistic—the mean—for a given population. Using only the mean to 
represent what really is a distribution of different individuals, thus ignoring the 
standard deviation of the distribution, might be problematic. Third, race-based 
expectancy tables ignore the skewness of the distributions. As we show next, a 
problem can arise when the distributions for the different groups (men vs.
women, whites vs. blacks) are skewed in opposite directions, suggesting that 
outliers impact the group means’ differences. In the following Parts, we 
explain these concerns in more detail.
                                                                                                                     
217 For now, we assume that accuracy in the determination of damages is a legitimate 
and important goal of tort law. We will discuss this point further on in the Article.
218 See G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez–Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 153 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Marc A. Zimmerman, Editorial, Resiliency Theory: A Strengths-
Based Approach to Research and Practice for Adolescent Health, 40 HEALTH EDUC. &
BEHAV. 381, 381 (2013).
219 McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing 
Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a Social 
Problem Is Real, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16, 23 (2005)).
220 Cf. Zimmerman, supra note 218, at 381.
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i. Data Tables Capture Only a Snapshot in Time
One concern regarding the use of life expectancy, worklife expectancy, 
and wage tables in determining tort damages relates to the fact that all of these 
tables look at the world only as it stands at a single point in time.221 Judge 
Weinstein recently highlighted this problem in Kimpson and McMillan,
arguing that race- and ethnicity-based statistics assume that the status-quo will 
continue in the future despite ongoing legal and intuitional efforts to fight 
discrimination in areas such as the workplace,222 and tables relying on archaic 
notions of race “fail to account for the nuanced reality of ‘racial’ heritage in 
the United States today.”223
Predictions about the future based on these data sources without any 
correction necessarily introduce systematic inaccuracy into the models, 
leading to inefficient incentives for tortfeasors. Three examples of this type of 
limitation are: changing trends in life expectancy; workforce participation 
(which is relevant for worklife tables); and academic achievement (which is 
relevant for wage tables).
1. Life Expectancy
Life expectancy for men is about five years less than for women; yet it is 
increasing at a much faster pace.224 For example, in Britain, where records 
have been kept since the 1840s, the difference in life expectancy peaked in 
1967 and has been in a relatively steep decline ever since.225 A group of expert 
actuaries and scientists, backed by the British insurer Legal & General, studied 
the root of this trend and found that lifestyle choices such as tobacco and 
alcohol consumption accounted for much of the difference in life 
expectancies.226 Writing about Europe as a whole, the expert panel found that 
deaths related to smoking “accounted for 40-60% of the gender gap,” a trend 
                                                                                                                     
221 McMillan, 253 F.R.D. at 251.
222 See Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 152–53.
223 McMillan, 253 F.R.D. at 251.
224 For example, “[f]rom 1989 to 2009, life expectancy [at birth] for men improved by 
4.6 years on average but only by 2.7 years for women. And throughout the country, women 
were more likely than men to have no progress in life expectancy or to have their lifespans 
get shorter over time.” Ali Mokdad, Girls Born in 2009 Will Live Shorter Lives than Their 
Mothers in Hundreds of US Counties, INST. FOR HEALTH METRICS & EVALUATION (Apr. 
19, 2012), http://www.healthdata.org/news-release/girls-born-2009-will-live-shorter-lives-
their-mothers-hundreds-us-counties [https://perma.cc/BUB9-9H5A].
225 Lifespan and the Sexes: Catching Up, ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21569362-rich-world-men-are-cl
osing-longevity-gap-women-catching-up [https://perma.cc/W9PB-P8VL]. 
226 LONGEVITY SCI. ADVISORY PANEL, LSAP PAPER 2, LIFE EXPECTANCY: PAST AND 
FUTURE VARIATIONS BY GENDER IN ENGLAND AND WALES 1, 20 (2012), 
http://www.longevitypanel.co.uk/_files/life-expectancy-by-gender.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8
K6-GAYB].
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that now appears to be in reverse as men (a much larger smoking population to 
begin with) are abandoning their smoking habits at a greater rate than 
women.227 In 1840s Britain, the life expectancy gap was a mere nine 
months—suggesting that the current trends of a decreasing gap may continue 
for some time into the future.228
2. Workforce Participation
Another trend supporting the use of blended tables involves the changing 
gender demographics of the American workforce. The gender gap exists in 
prevailing estimated damages models at least in part because women, on 
average, are less likely to participate in the workforce.229
As a result, proportionately, women are better represented in younger 
segments of the workforce.230 Since a worker’s earnings are thought to reach 
their maximum at around the age of forty,231 if current Labor Force 
Participation Rate trends continue, women today will likely also realize larger 
increases in income over their working lives than past generations 
experienced. Furthermore, the fact that some companies are enacting policies 
allowing female employees who give birth more flexibility in returning to 
work will likely lead to fewer mothers withdrawing entirely from the 
workforce.232 This shift seems especially likely when also considering current 
trends in educational attainment.233
3. Relative Academic Achievement
The wage tables used in the forensic models are susceptible to similar 
inaccuracies stemming from a failure to account for developing academic 
                                                                                                                     
227 Id. at 19–20.
228 See id. at 7, 8 figs.1 & 2. 
229 For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s worklife estimate, last updated in 
1986, suggested that a forty-year-old male would have an estimated worklife expectancy of 
twenty years while a woman of the same age would only be predicted to work 14.3 more 
years—a difference of nearly 40%. Smith, supra note 50, at 3. Today, an employed forty-
year-old woman with a bachelor’s degree is predicted to have a remaining worklife of 
21.78 years. Skoog et al., Markov Process Model, supra note 57, at 204 tbl.25.
230 Laura Cox Kaplan, How Young Women Are Changing the Workplace, WORLD 
ECON. F. (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/10/millennial-women-
changing-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/XTL5-6HWD]; see also Cate Doty, Addressing the 
Gender Gap in College Aspirations, N.Y. TIMES: THE CHOICE (Oct. 23, 2009), 
https://thechoice.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/addressing-the-gender-gap-in-colleges/?_r=1
[https://perma.cc/7A4A-TQ6W].
231 Katie Bardaro, Pay Goes Nowhere After 40, PAYSCALE (2011), 
http://www.payscale.com/career-news/2011/03/pay-goes-nowhere-after-40 [https://perma.c
c/M3TP-TMGL]. 
232 See Kaplan, supra note 230.
233 See Doty, supra note 230.
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achievement trends. Numerous studies have documented the association 
between education and increased earning power.234 In fact, for every 100
female college graduates, there are now only seventy-three male graduates,235
and a corresponding adjustment in earning power for women vis-à-vis men 
may already be apparent.236 While women, across all age demographics, earn 
on average about 80% as much as men, unmarried women under thirty without 
children earn significantly more than their male counterparts.237 In some major 
cities—such as New York, Memphis, and Atlanta—this difference may even 
be in the 15% to 20% range.238 Notably, the BLS announced a few years ago 
that “for the first time, women made up the majority of the workforce in 
highly paid managerial positions.”239
In sum, the datasets forensic economists use when creating models that 
estimate tort damages only view those data at one single point in time. 
However, in a dynamic and ever-changing world, this approach does not 
account for such fluidity and introduces a number of inaccuracies into these 
models, which systematically distorts parties’ incentives. 
ii. Structural Problems
The previous Part revealed a problem that theoretically forensic 
economists can remedy by building more sophisticated models that take into 
account convergence trends between the sexes and races. Obviously, using 
inaccurate tables is a bad policy decision. But what about using accurate 
tables? Is that good policy? In this Part we discuss structural problems that 
cannot be as easily remedied, as they are inherent to any usage of tables’
averages. 
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1. Ignoring Standard Errors 
Forensic economists commonly offer a number of different scenarios to 
“establish a high and low range of expected losses.”240 This practice is likely 
also a result of the large standard deviations with which they have to deal.241
One of the reasons courts are unaware of the imprecisions in the data 
might be that the U.S. Life Tables (2008), published by the CDC in the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, do not contain any estimates of 
variance or standard deviation.242 As a result, courts seem to believe the 
published averages offer a good estimate of the entire distribution.243 This 
assumption is incorrect. Indeed various scholars have made attempts to 
estimate the precision of life expectancy data.244 For example, according to 
Ciecka and Ciecka, the CDC table suggests that thirty-nine-year-old men have, 
on average, thirty-six years left to live.245 However, their calculated standard 
deviation of 14.1 suggests that most men, in fact about two-thirds of them, 
really have between about twenty-two and fifty years left to live.246
Similar difficulties plague worklife expectancy data as well. Skoog, 
Ciecka, and Krueger show that the worklife expectancy table’s standard 
deviation is sometimes greater than both its estimated mean and median, 
especially for older individuals.247
Finally, large variances within the BLS wage table data also exist.248 This 
is particularly true for some occupations experiencing a high variation in 
pay.249
                                                                                                                     
240 Kent Gilbreath, Experiences from Two Decades: Some Practical Advice for 
Forensic Economists, LITIG. ECON. DIG., Spring 1996, at 35, 38.
241 See id.
242 Arias, supra note 39, at 10 tbl.1.
243 See, e.g., Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1178 (N.D. Iowa 
2003), aff’d, 382 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2004).
244 See generally HUGH RICHARDS & MICHAEL DONALDSON, LIFE AND WORKLIFE 
EXPECTANCIES (2d ed. 2010); James Ciecka & Peter Ciecka, Life Expectancy and the 
Properties of Survival Data, LITIG. ECON. DIG., Spring 1996, at 19 (attempting to estimate 
the precision life expectancy data).
245 Ciecka & Ciecka, supra note 244, at 29 tbl.2. See generally RICHARDS &
DONALDSON, supra note 244.
246 See Ciecka & Ciecka, supra note 244, at 26 tbl.1.
247 Skoog et al., Markov Process Model, supra note 57, at 196 tbl.17.
248 May 2012 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates United States,
BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm [https://perma.cc/2TA3-
SAMZ] (last modified Nov. 27, 2013). 
249 In the legal occupation, for example, the difference in pay between the seventy-fifth
and twenty-fifth percentiles is actually greater than the median pay. See Occupational 
Employment and Wages in 2014, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/o
pub/ted/2015/occupational-employment-wages-2014.htm [https://perma.cc/YA9X-ZCG4]. 
For almost all other major occupational groups, the difference between the ninetieth and 
tenth percentile is greater than the median pay. See id.
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One might conjecture that using blended tables will reduce the variance, as 
many more observations are thrown into the mix. Mathematically, however, 
this outcome is not guaranteed.250 Thus, only in those cases where it is 
possible to know that the variance of the blended distributions is indeed 
smaller, using blended tables might be welfare-increasing.251 Similar to the 
mechanism of insurance, whereby risk-averse individuals prefer a small loss 
over a small chance to suffer a large loss, from a welfare perspective it might 
be preferable to miscompensate many people by a little (when using blended 
tables with smaller variances) than to miscompensate a smaller number of 
people by a lot (when using nonblended tables).252
2. Distributions Are Skewed 
As we saw, using blended tables does not guarantee more precision; 
indeed, until more of the underlying data from which the tables are constructed 
is released, courts are unlikely to know whether or not using blended tables 
will reduce the variance.253 Therefore, the previous argument probably does 
not provide a strong enough reason to abandon race- and gender-based tables 
on efficiency grounds. 
Now we turn to another feature of the distribution, which measures a 
distribution’s asymmetry or skewness. As the next figure shows, in general, 
distributions can be symmetric, where the mean, the mode, and the median 
converge. But they can also be asymmetric, in which case these three statistics 
do not converge. The skewness of the data raises an interesting problem. First, 
if the distribution of the advantaged group is positively skewed and that of the 
disadvantaged group is negatively skewed, then even if the difference between 
the means of the distributions is statistically significant, the difference between 
                                                                                                                     
250 SARA E. BURKE, COMBINED VARIANCE OF TWO GROUPS WITH EQUAL NUMBERS OF 
OBSERVATIONS 3 (Jan. 2014), http://www.saraemilyburke.com/stats/CombinedVarianceEq
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251 See id. 
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253 See id. 
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the modes or medians may not be. In that case, the justification to treat 
differently men and women, or whites and blacks, is significantly weakened. 
Figure 1: Long-Tail Versus Normal Distributions254
As Figure 1 shows, when the distributions face away from each other, the 
distance between the medians and the modes is smaller than the difference 
between the means.255 Theoretically, it is possible that these differences are 
statistically insignificant even when the difference between the means is
statistically significant. Where that is the case, the argument goes, these two 
groups should be treated as one. The normative justification for ignoring the 
tails (as when one uses the median instead of the mean of the distribution) is 
that it might make little sense to let people at the tails of the distribution 
determine the destiny of the entire group. After all, courts are attempting to 
predict what would be the long-run losses of a child, with a level of confidence 
of “more likely than not.” Therefore, if courts seek to maximize the accuracy 
of compensation, and they have to choose one statistic to reflect the entire 
distribution, they should perhaps choose the mode, which reflects the salary 
earned (based on life expectancy or worklife expectancy) by the largest 
number of people. Alternatively, they can choose the median, which reflects 
the salary (based on life expectancy or years at work) that at least 50% of the 
population will achieve.
b. Second Potential Outlet: Existing Discrepancies Between Groups Are 
a Result of Market Failures that Require a Fix
In the previous Part, we argued that courts systematically use inaccurate 
and therefore inadequate tables that might distort parties’ diligence incentives. 
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In this Part we explore the argument that this practice also distorts victims’
incentives to invest in their skills. 
It is well known that employers value job attachment.256 Yet, historically, 
women have had lower job market attachment than men.257 Several 
nonmutually exclusive reasons could underlie this phenomenon. A particular 
woman’s job attachment may be low because of employer discrimination—
either direct (such as when employers prefer to fire women or blacks first and 
then men and whites),258 or indirect (such as when a white male-dominated 
workplace is hostile toward women or blacks, causing women or blacks to quit 
their jobs or miss out on important bonding opportunities essential to 
advancement).259 Alternately, job attachment may be low due to choices some 
female employees make: women may prefer to be involved directly in child-
rearing, and workplace policies governing staff promotion may lack the 
requisite flexibility that would enable working mothers to satisfactorily 
complete their employment duties while raising children.260
In either of these indirect cases, employers may rationally prefer hiring 
white males over otherwise identical blacks or female candidates because, 
probabilistically speaking, there are higher profits to be had from hiring a 
white man as the return on job-specific training is higher.261 The question is 
whether this rational discrimination by employers is socially inefficient, and if 
so, why? 
The answer is that such discrimination is indeed inefficient, and the 
reasons are myriad. First, the inefficiency may arise from the self-perpetuating 
nature of this cycle of thinking. If employers (i) are less likely to employ 
women in jobs that require job attachment, (ii) fail to offer workplace 
initiatives to create more suitable workplaces for women, and/or (iii) 
inadequately balance the needs of women who choose to rear children by 
failing to institute workplace initiatives designed to improve retention of those 
employees, then some (if not many) women may respond rationally by getting 
more involved in child-rearing than men.262 Thus, they become less likely to 
acquire the skills necessary to perform well in those jobs, inadvertently 
confirming the erroneous beliefs held by employers regarding job market 
                                                                                                                     
256 Kenneth A. Couch & Robert Fairlie, Last Hired, First Fired? Black-White 
Unemployment and the Business Cycle, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 227, 229 (2010).
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258 Couch & Fairlie, supra note 256, at 227; Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and 
Title VII, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1544, 1544 (1975); see also Guthrie v. Colonial Bakery Co., 
No. 16455, 1972 WL 276, at *1, *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 1973) (order and final decree)
(deciding a case where women were being laid off while men were allowed to continue 
working during a restructuring).
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attachment.263 In this case, such beliefs are self-confirming. The same thinking 
can be applied to black employees.264 Assuming female and black employees’
inherent and unchanging preferences are not driving this assumption on the 
part of employers, this is inefficient at the societal level because women and 
blacks—the disadvantaged groups—could yield higher profits for their 
employers if common employment practices within the labor market were not 
discriminatory and beliefs were not asymmetric across groups to begin with.265
Since this job market discrimination is socially undesirable, the argument 
goes, courts should implicitly correct for the market failures stemming from 
sexist or racist practices as well as from asymmetric beliefs across groups by 
ignoring those wage gaps. Accordingly, tort law should award loss of future 
income based on a hypothetical nondiscriminatory efficient market. 
One may consider the difficulty with this argument in the context under 
discussion to be the seeming unlikelihood that victims’—especially children’s
or their benevolent agent’s—incentives to invest in developing their human 
capital would really be influenced by the fact that courts use nonblended tables 
in tort cases. Whereas almost everyone seeks a job, only very few face 
accidents. Thus, it is easier to see how job market imperfections might lead to 
distorted incentives for young adults from disadvantaged groups toward 
investing in their human skills. Since accidents are so rare, the broad principle 
that discriminatory practices in tort law lead to inefficient investment in 
human capital is a harder sell—especially in regard to children. The law and 
economics movement has yet to prove empirically the first order effects of 
legal rules; namely, the effects on parties’ incentives to take care. The 
existence of second-order effects—the effects on victims’ incentives to invest 
in their human capital—is a much longer shot. 
c. Third Potential Outlet: Economic Efficiency Does Not Require a 
Distinction Between the Willingness-to-Pay of the Rich and the Poor
A classic result in the economic analysis of law is that policies should 
always be contemplated by performing a cost–benefit analysis that relies on 
people’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) without any distributive weights attached 
                                                                                                                     
263 Couch & Fairlie, supra note 256, at 227, 229.
264 If employers fail to offer mentorship opportunities for black employees and policies 
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front-end costs and greater popularity with higher-income individuals. Id.
265 See Andrea Moro, Statistical Discrimination, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY ECON.,
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2009_S000544 [https://perma.cc/2H
66-XL9N].
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to it.266 And since the WTP of the rich is greater than that of the poor, 
policies—such as safety decisions—should reflect these differences.267
Recently, Professors Ariel Porat and Avraham Tabbach have suggested 
that the economic analysis of law does not require society to place a different 
value on safety measures for the rich and the poor.268 Porat and Tabbach start 
by observing that wealthy people are willing to spend more than poor people 
on self-risk-reduction because they ascribe a higher value to their ability to 
consume their wealth during their lifetimes.269 However, since wealth is 
transferable, society should invest in those individuals equally when deciding
to invest in rich or poor people’s safety, as it should consider social rather than 
private values.270 Therefore, the value of life should be determined 
irrespective of wealth.271
Albeit correct, Porat and Tabbach’s argument cannot save law and 
economics from the unpalatable realities we focus on in this Article. Our claim 
transcends theirs in that we argue that tort law should also not consider human 
capital in determining optimal safety investments. Human capital, unlike 
existing monetary wealth, is not transferable. Essentially, Porat and Tabbach 
say that at age seventy, there is no reason to take more care to protect, for 
example, Mark Zuckerberg’s life than anyone else’s because he’s already 
created the wealth he has.272 If he dies, someone else will get it. But at age 
eighteen, this is not the case. If Zuckerberg were to have died then, all that 
wealth would not have been created and the human capital that created that 
wealth would have disappeared. Therefore, even if it accepts Porat and 
Tabbach’s pointed argument,273 the law and economics movement will still 
hold that, ceteris paribus, society ought to spend more resources to protect 
human capital that has greater value. Unlike the case of accumulated wealth, 
there is no corresponding positive externality to third parties when human 
capital dies. 
We argue, in contrast, that statistical differences in human capital related 
to race and gender should be ignored; therefore, Porat and Tabbach’s argument 
cannot save law and economics. 
                                                                                                                     
266 A general articulation of this statement can be found in Kaplow, supra note 216, at 
159–75.
267 See Porat, supra note 204, at 100; see also Ariel Porat & Avraham Tabbach, 
Willingness to Pay, Death, Wealth, and Damages, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 45, 45–52 
(2011).
268 Porat & Tabbach, supra note 267, at 45–52.
269 See id. at 52–57.
270 Id. at 55.
271 Id.
272 See id. at 55–57.
273 Id. at 45–57.
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d. Fourth Potential Outlet: Private Law Should Not Only be Geared 
Toward Economic Efficiency
Another potential outlet through which law and economics scholars could 
avoid their—in our view, unacceptable—association with discriminatory 
targeting practices is to incorporate the notion of equality, first into the social 
welfare function, and second into private law. Kaplow and Shavell have no 
problem with the former, but they object to the latter.274 Specifically, they 
theorize that principles of fairness, specifically distributive justice principles, 
may be incorporated into social welfare analysis as individuals may well have 
preferences for equality, and those preferences affect their well-being just like 
their preference for art, nature, or fine wine.275 The two issues that arise are 
first, how exactly should we account for equality in the social welfare 
function, and at what cost; and second, should we account for equality within 
the boundaries of private law? We address these two questions in turn. 
i. What Is the Trade-Off Between Equality and Efficiency?
We start with the first issue. One way of accounting for equality is to grant 
equality lexical priority over efficiency. Accordingly, one may argue that 
ultimately, the principle of restitutio ad integrum cannot be normatively 
superior to the principle that all people are created equal. Simply put, no one 
deserves to be targeted because of race or gender or because of the impact of 
race and gender on one’s “value” in the legal system. The school bus example 
was designed to demonstrate our distaste for both ex post differential treatment 
and the distorted ex ante incentives to take proper care.276 The example is 
troubling because it feels unfair to pay lower damages to victims belonging to 
disadvantaged groups, but also because it feels unfair to allocate buses and 
drivers in a way that targets those groups to begin with. We are troubled by 
these feelings because individuals who are equally worthy of society’s
protection are underprotected.277 Cost–benefit analysis, so goes that argument, 
should start only after the commitment to strict equality has been 
established.278 Thus, society should not abandon the commitment to equality 
                                                                                                                     
274 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 215, at 332–33, 336, 351–52.
275 Id. The authors argue that policy assessment should be based exclusively on well-
being (including the impact of equality on well-being), but that no weight should be 
accorded to independent notions of fairness. Id. at 360. In this Article, we accept their 
framework and therefore ignore alternative consequentialist views (as opposed to simple 
welfarists) according to which equality is intrinsically valuable (in general, or in specific 
contexts such as saving lives). See id. at 332–33.
276 See supra Part IV.C.1.
277 See Porat & Tabbach, supra note 267, at 73.
278 See id. at 49–50, 50 n.4 (citing Tomas J. Philipson et al., Terminal Care and the 
Value of Life Near Its End (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15649, 
2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15649.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT72-5CZU]).
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and allow women and minorities to be “targeted,” but rather should abandon 
the purportedly accurate statistical application of restitutio ad integrum for a 
less accurate statistical application that recognizes the priority value society 
places on equality. 
One of the problems with this potential outlet is that many people may not 
believe that notions of equality should always trump efficiency regardless of 
the costs to society. Indeed, most people do not lend equality lexical priority. 
More likely, they believe in some trade-off between equality and the costs to 
society from the “inefficiencies” involved in having an egalitarian damages 
rule.279 Thus, a moderated version of the argument advances the position that,
while preferences for equality should comprise part of the social welfare 
function, they should not be considered lexically prior to efficiency;280 rather, 
they should be given some weight. Since policymakers need to maximize 
welfare and not just wealth, and because welfare includes people’s preference 
for equality, policymakers should account for equality, but only in as much as 
it affects people’s well-being.281 Accordingly, since most people have 
preferences that are nondiscriminatory, at least to some extent, economic 
analysis of law should support nondiscriminatory policies—at least as long as 
such policies are not too costly in terms of misallocation of resources.282
The main problem with this line of thought is that it does not produce the 
“desired” result when a sufficient number of people have racist or sexist 
(other-regarding) preferences in society, or think that welfare maximization 
justifies inequality such that the overall welfare analysis yields that the 
maintenance of discrimination.283
Another possible reason why policymaking should not always be geared to 
narrow efficiency considerations involves Rule Utilitarianism.284 The idea in 
Rule Utilitarianism (to be distinguished from Act Utilitarianism) is that 
following general rules that tend to lead to the greatest good will have better 
consequences overall than allowing ad hoc efficient exceptions to be made in 
                                                                                                                     
279 See id. at 45.
280 See id. at 58–59.
281 See id.
282 See Porat, supra note 204, at 102 (“I cannot see how the efficiency goal would be 
frustrated if society were to ascribe identical value to the lives and limbs of all its 
members.”). 
283 Interestingly, one can find both economists and egalitarians that agree such 
preferences should be excluded. John Harsanyi, a Nobel Laureate in economics, argued 
such preferences should be excluded from the social welfare function. JOHN C. HARSANYI,
RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS
62–64 (1977). So did Ronald Dworkin, a political philosopher. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234 (1977). A complete treatment of the problem of external 
preferences is beyond the scope of this Article, but observe that in the main text we count 
external preferences. 
284 HARSANYI, supra note 283, at 62–64; BARBARA MACKINNON, ETHICS: THEORY 
AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, CONCISE EDITION 37–39 (2d ed. 2013).
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individual acts, even if better consequences can be demonstrated in those 
instances.285
Rule Utilitarianism certainly provides stability compared to Act 
Utilitarianism.286 It seems appealing, as most of us would prefer not to live in 
a society in which each decision is made by ad hoc robotic cost–benefit 
analyses, but rather in a society where generally efficient rules are always 
enforced, even if in some rare cases they generate undesirable outcomes.287
Why? Because history and common sense teach us that the former comprises 
an inferior society to be in.288 A rule against murdering is an efficient rule 
even if by murdering one, society can save five.289 Indeed, too much Act 
Utilitarianism, so goes the argument, would lead to a continuous pattern of 
targeting disadvantaged groups, which in turn would lead to negative external 
effects outside the actor’s decision to target the group.290
Rule Utilitarianism provides a potential outlet to the targeting problem in 
tort law, the argument continues, because it suggests that not targeting the 
disadvantaged may be beneficial overall, even if in a given case it is 
demonstrably not.291
To see this more clearly, observe the similarity between the problem at 
hand and the famous “trolley problem,” which deals with the dilemma of 
killing one or killing five.292 How would we like our company manger to train 
her drivers in cases similar to the “trolley problem”? Imagine the morning 
brief: can we picture the manager briefing her drivers that if the bus’s brakes 
malfunction and they have to run over a child, and if there is a white boy on 
the right and a black girl on the left, the drivers should avoid the former? For a 
simple Act Utilitarian, the driver should take the path toward the individual 
who has the lowest cost: this would mean killing the black girl versus the 
white boy, or the one person standing on the track versus five in the original 
trolley problem.293
One of the classic approaches to the original trolley problem is a Rule 
Utilitarian solution: one should not take affirmative action to save others from 
inevitable harm if that means harming another innocent life, as the violation of 
such a rule would degrade the moral significance of the individual and his/her 
                                                                                                                     
285 HARSANYI, supra note 283, at 62–64; MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 37–38.
286 HARSANYI, supra note 283, at 61–63; MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 37–38.
287 See MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 38–39.
288 HARSANYI, supra note 283, at 62–64.
289 See MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 37–38.
290 See id. at 36–37.
291 See id. at 37–38.
292 Originally proposed by Philippa Foot, the basic “trolley problem” asks whether 
one, in the position of a driver in control of a trolley with failed brakes heading toward five 
men, would use a spur on the track to avoid the five men but kill one man standing on the 
spur. See PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
23–25 (1978); see also MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 36.
293 See MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 36–38; see also FOOT, supra note 292, at 19–
24.
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associated rights.294 From a social welfare perspective, Rule Utilitarianism 
might entail that the driver needs to randomize her actions so that no single 
group is targeted.295 Targeting the black girl might undermine social cohesion 
in a manner that would create a greater loss in future welfare than would be 
gained by an “optimal” tailoring of the driving rules now.296
Unfortunately, Rule Utilitarianism is unlikely to provide an adequate 
outlet for the problem at hand. First, Rule Utilitarianism cannot simply assert 
that adherence to the driver’s code (of not always targeting blacks or women) 
will maximize overall social welfare. Rule Utilitarianism will have to 
demonstrate empirically or to provide a sounder theoretical argument for how 
exactly eliminating the use of nonblended tables will improve welfare in the 
long run.297 While some believe this might be achievable, it has not been 
proven. Simply asserting that Rule Utilitarianism will resolve our problem 
flirts with begging the question.298 Second, and relatedly, even under Rule 
Utilitarianism, it might be desirable to kill the one in order to save, say, one 
hundred, or one hundred thousand.299 Thus, under not implausible 
assumptions, Rule Utilitarianism might still require drivers to target the 
disadvantaged groups. For example, suppose that the kids in a disadvantaged 
neighborhood will really not contribute much to society’s overall welfare. 
Perhaps because they are all sick, or drug addicts, or whatever. Furthermore, 
suppose that the preferences for equality of the members in the advantaged 
groups are not strong enough to overcome their resistance to seeing trucks 
diverted towards their kids. Under these assumptions, targeting might still be 
desirable even under Rule Utilitarianism. And yet, that seems wrong. At the 
end of the day, even Rule Utilitarianism requires some cost–benefit analysis. 
To conduct any cost–benefit analysis, one must explore what the costs 
involved in targeting the cheaper, disadvantaged groups really are.300 For law 
and economics scholars, this entails an investigation of the ex ante incentives 
stemming from the fact that courts evaluate ex post damages more 
“accurately”—that is, by using nonblended tables.301 To concretize this idea, 
we start with the classic example, à la Kaplow, where potential tortfeasors 
cannot anticipate in advance the value of the losses they create (imagine a 
driver passing through a place she is unfamiliar with and therefore not 
knowing anything about the typical profile of her potential victims in that 
area).302 In such a case, assuming that accuracy is costly, requiring the court to 
                                                                                                                     
294 See MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 36–39.
295 See HARSANYI, supra note 283, at 61–64; MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 37–39.
296 See HARSANYI, supra note 283, at 61–64; MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 37–39.
297 See HARSANYI, supra note 283, at 61–64; MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 37–39.
298 See HARSANYI, supra note 283, at 61–64; MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 37–39.
299 See HARSANYI, supra note 283, at 61–64; MACKINNON, supra note 284, at 37–39.
300 See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 307 (1994).
301 See id. at 307, 311–16. 
302 Id. at 313–14.
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award accurate damages amounts to a social waste because that information 
cannot improve the level of care tortfeasors already chose to undertake.303
Accordingly, courts should award “inaccurate,” or average, damages, thus 
saving on litigation costs.304 But since in our case both blended and 
nonblended tables are equally costly—they are both free—this analysis does 
not help us decide whether using one type of table is more efficient than using 
the other. 
The picture changes when potential drivers can anticipate, and thus affect, 
whether their accidents will involve a “low value” victim, such as when 
routing trips through predominantly black neighborhoods.305 If, in the latter 
case, the ex post damages award reflects the magnitude of the actual loss 
caused, future decisions regarding levels of care and activity will be adjusted 
accordingly.306 Kaplow’s classic framework asks us to consider in such cases 
whether a change “in behavior on account of accuracy is sufficiently desirable 
to justify the cost of greater accuracy.”307
But again, since the government provides the statistical tables at no cost, 
the use of race- and gender-based statistical tables is free. Therefore, according 
to Kaplow’s framework, greater accuracy should be always desirable, as it
incentivizes the potential tortfeasor to make decisions that minimize her 
potential damages.308 This result is also considered socially desirable because, 
again under Kaplow’s framework, the damages the tortfeasor pays equal the 
social harm she inflicted.309 By minimizing the amount of damages paid, the 
tortfeasor also minimizes the social harm she causes.310 From this perspective, 
targeting is not only not problematic but actually desirable.311
But for societies that prioritize equality in their social welfare function, a 
tortfeasor’s damages liability does not equal the social harm she caused.312 In 
such societies, reducing the tortfeasor’s damages when she harms blacks or 
women, instead of whites or men, does not reflect the collective value society 
places on the social harm caused.313 There, the preference for equality entails 
that social harm is the same in all cases, regardless of whether the injured 
party is black or white, male or female.314 Therefore, greater accuracy (even if 
costless) is of no value in such societies, as it does not really save social costs 
                                                                                                                     
303 Id.
304 See id. at 321–22.
305 Id. at 314–16.
306 Kaplow, supra note 300, at 314–15.
307 Id. at 315. 
308 Id. at 314–16.
309 Id. at 318–19.
310 Id. 
311 See id.
312 See Kaplow, supra note 300, at 314–16, 321–23.
313 See id. 
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but only shifts them, regressively, to blacks and women, thus reducing the 
overall social welfare.315
ii. Is Private Law the Place to Take Preferences for Equality into 
Account?
We now turn to the second question, of whether private law is at all the 
right locus for dealing with society-wide problems of discrimination. Even if 
one accepts that equality matters to the social welfare function, as well as the 
extent to which it matters, it is still not clear that society should worry about 
inequality between groups in the rare context of injury or death. Rather, 
society should reduce inequality between groups in effective, fiscal ways 
within relevant distributive justice institutions (namely the tax and transfer 
system).316 Therefore, the argument goes, tort law should still be geared only 
toward efficiency, compensating victims according to the real harm they have 
suffered.317 Put differently, tweaking tort law to fix problems of discrimination 
is like fixing a dent in a car that has a weak engine: it might improve things a 
bit, but would not really solve the problem of discrimination in society. 
Indeed, realms of legal analysis have been devoted to the question of 
whether private law should be geared toward efficiency only or whether it 
should take distributive justice concerns into account.318 As Kaplow and 
Shavell famously argued, for every distribution made via private law, in an 
alternative legal regime private law is geared toward efficiency and 
distribution is undertaken via the tax and transfer system, which leaves 
everyone better off.319
                                                                                                                     
315 A related argument emerges when one considers tortfeasors’ incentive to invest in 
learning about their potential victim’s “value.” As Kaplow demonstrated, potential 
tortfeasors’ incentive to invest in learning about their potential victims’ value (as reflected 
by courts) will depend on the degree of accuracy courts employ in determining damages. 
Id. at 316. A sufficient incentive exists where the tortfeasor’s potential gains exceed the 
cost of the information. Id. at 317. Put differently, in Kaplow’s framework, information 
about the ex post loss is valuable only if it is reflected in the court’s ex post awards. Id. But 
those who care about equality would not necessarily want the potential tortfeasor to invest 
in learning where the “low value” victims (as determined by courts) are—namely, they do 
not want tortfeasors to learn where the disadvantaged victims are—because they believe 
targeting would result in social waste. See id. Thus, for them, blended tables are superior. 
316 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 667–69.
317 See Keren-Paz, supra note 161, at 276–79.
318 E.g., Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in 
Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1126–32
(2004); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1653–58 (1998); see also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 669;
Keren-Paz, supra note 161, at 278–86; Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New 
Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1005–14 (2001); Chris William 
Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 797–98 (2000).
319 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 669.
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In contrast, Kyle Logue and the first Author described conditions under 
which private law can be more efficient “on the ground” than the tax and 
transfer system to distribute wealth.320 Indeed, even if theoretically, 
distribution via the tax and transfer system is more efficient than via private 
law, in reality distribution via the former is subject to distortions and various 
market failures of its own.321 Thus, in practice, distribution via private law is 
often preferable. As an analogy, consider the problem of developing a fast 
aircraft:
whereas it is theoretically possible to approach the speed of light, the 
practical difficulties involved in actually implementing this theoretical 
possibility prohibits the creation of super high-speed spacecraft. [And yet,] 
[n]o one argues that we should stop building slow yet practical spacecraft 
because for every such spaceship, there is an alternative, albeit purely 
theoretical, design that would travel faster.322
In sum, according to this outlet, as long as enough people have sufficiently 
strong preferences for an egalitarian legal regime, it might be efficient to 
eliminate the discriminatory impact of tort law.323 Such a regime would mimic 
the hypothetical Coasean bargaining that would have occurred between 
tortfeasors, victims, and the rest of society—as the latter presumably suffer 
from the external harm generated from knowing they live under a system in 
which blacks and women are targeted.324 And, since the tax and transfer 
system is not free of distortions or inefficiencies, it might be efficient to 
eliminate the discriminatory impact of tort law by changing tort law itself and 
using blended tables.325
Moreover, the argument about the pointlessness of using private law as a 
way to fix all problems of discrimination writ large overlooks a very important 
issue. Eliminating nonblended tables aims at eliminating the smaller problem 
of the ex ante targeting incentives tort law creates.326 Indeed, shifting to 
blended tables is costless and will immediately eliminate the ex ante targeting 
incentives, whereas increasing equality between the genders and races writ 
large as a way to eliminate the ex ante incentives comprises a costlier, 
lengthier process.327 The claim that we should not fix a dent in the car with a 
weak engine is misleading. As long as we have to drive a car with a weak 
engine, fixing the dent might well be optimal. 
                                                                                                                     
320 Avraham et al., supra note 318, at 1149.
321 Id. at 1127–30.
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323 See id. at 1127–30.
324 See John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment 
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3. Summary
Any compensatory tort scheme that statistically accounts for race and 
gender will encourage rational actors to make choices that disadvantage 
individuals in demographics that warrant lower tort liability costs. In practice, 
this means that the tort system not only perpetuates race and gender 
discrimination by relying on historical data, but also pushes discrimination 
into the future by providing potential tortfeasors with perverse ex ante
incentives.328
We hold that economic analysis of law should support blended tables not 
only because when considering notions of equality, blended tables are welfare-
maximizing, but also because they are more efficient than nonblended tables. 
Given the tables’ inaccuracies, outdated nature, and the fact that they might 
describe skewed distributions by using averages, using blended tables seems 
like the efficient thing to do. But our goal was more ambitious than that; we 
sought to explore the extent to which even using accurate nonblended tables is 
inefficient. Our aim was not so much to engage in the debate about the classic 
trade-off between efficiency and fairness, but rather to demonstrate that tort 
law can be made both more efficient and fairer simultaneously. Ultimately, our 
argument is that targeting the disadvantaged is inefficient because, under 
reasonable assumptions about the role of equality in the social welfare 
function, targeting does not save social costs to defendants (but only private 
costs) while imposing extra costs on those already worse off; therefore, such 
targeting is welfare reducing.329
When viewed as an attempt to make tort law more efficient (and not just to 
solve problems of discrimination), this call to change the way damages are 
calculated is no different from the hundreds of other research articles written 
within the law and economics tradition that attempt to increase the efficiency 
of tort law by suggesting tweaks to existing doctrines.330
Indeed, when comparing contemporary tort law’s approach to valuing 
injuries with the approach taken by agencies conducting cost-benefit analyses, 
the similarity of the approach proposed here and the one taken by agencies 
                                                                                                                     
328 See id. 
329 One can reach the same results from two other perspectives. First, given that the 
magnitude of the loss of a child to his or her parent is so big, the percentage difference in 
the loss of a disadvantaged child and an advantaged child, from a social welfare 
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becomes clear.331 For example, in the environmental realm, uniform monetary 
figures are placed on different injuries (as is a uniform cost for lost life), 
irrespective of the actual loss.332 This rule-like approach, which utilizes very 
little ad hoc information, would be quite efficient in adjudication. The use of a 
uniform approach is remarkable considering the fact that agencies using cost-
benefit analysis are probably far more effective in affecting accident 
prevention than tort law is.333 Similarly, various highway safety-related 
decisions are made both by courts adjudicating tort cases and by agencies in 
building and repairing highways, inspecting automobiles, setting speed limits, 
etc.334 But whereas tort law attempts to use a more “accurate” compensation 
methodology, the agencies involved apply simple uniform charts. 
Perhaps closer to home, insurers in their role as private safety regulators 
also use uniform tables.335 For example, experience rating formulas for setting
third party liability premiums in car insurance take into account past accidents, 
but not whether the driver injured a man or a woman, a black individual or a 
white one.336 The increased premium is blind to this factor perhaps because 
insurers believe that the identity of the victim is random.337 Private insurance 
companies price in advance the same car accident that generates gender- and
race-based damage awards, as if the damage award were gender- and race-
neutral.338 Courts can do the same and should use only blended tables.
V. DISCRIMINATORY DAMAGE CALCULATION IN FEDERAL LAWS
The discussion so far has focused on tort law, which is based on common 
law. Yet surprisingly, courts consider race and gender even when calculating 
the damages given to plaintiffs suffering from violations of federal law; and 
not just any federal law, but also some of our most progressive statutory 
frameworks: Title VII,339 The Americans with Disabilities Act,340 and The 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.341 In such cases, one would expect
that the unconstitutionality of this practice could be easily demonstrated in 
court, because the Constitution is more easily applicable. And yet, courts 
                                                                                                                     
331 See Porat & Tabbach, supra note 267, at 50 & n.4 (citing Philipson et al., supra
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routinely use race- and gender-based tables when awarding damages to victims 
protected by these laws. This Part provides a brief overview of the problem. 
A. Title VII
The most ironic race- and gender-based damage award calculations occur 
in Title VII cases. Title VII is the statutory cause of action for workers 
suffering discrimination in the workplace due to their race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.342 In landmark case law, the Supreme Court held that Title 
VII prohibits employers from requiring female employees to make higher 
contributions to their retirement fund—regardless of the employer’s use of life 
expectancy tables to construct and support the policy.343 In City of Los Angeles 
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, the employer used life expectancy 
tables to determine that female employees live longer than male employees, 
therefore concluding that pension costs are higher for retired females because 
more payments would have to be made to the women.344 The Manhart Court 
noted that “[a]ctuarial studies could unquestionably identify differences in life 
expectancy based on race or national origin, as well as sex. But [the] 
statute . . . was designed to make race irrelevant in the employment 
market.”345 Shortly after, in Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred 
Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, the Court similarly held 
that women should not receive lower retirement benefits on the basis of their 
increased longevity.346 The Court held that “‘[e]ven a true generalization about 
[a] class’ cannot justify class-based treatment.”347
Although race- and gender-based compensatory damage awards in the 
Title VII context seem at odds with the statute’s purpose, evidence exists that 
courts are permitted to use race- and gender-based considerations, including 
race- and gender-based tables, in determining the appropriateness of front-
pay.348 While courts are unlikely to use statistical tables to determine a 
plaintiff’s wage when evaluating the appropriateness of front-pay,349 they are 
                                                                                                                     
342 Id. § 2000e-2.
343 City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 705, 702, 716–17
(1978).
344 Id. at 705.
345 Id. at 709 (footnote omitted). The Court noted the case did not “involve a fictional 
difference between men and women. It involve[d] a generalization that the parties accept as 
unquestionably true: Women, as a class, do live longer than men.” Id. at 707.
346 Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. 
Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1086 (1983) (per curiam).
347 Id. at 1084–85 (alterations in original) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708).
348 Front-pay means “the wage differential between [plaintiff’s] current position and 
the position which he was denied.” Colwell v. Suffolk Cty. Police Dep’t, 967 F. Supp.
1419, 1432 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d, 158 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 1998).
349 Statistical wage tables are unlikely to be used because compensatory damage 
awards are limited to a maximum amount of $300,000 in the Title VII context. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(b)(3) (2012). Because Title VII deals with discrimination in the workplace, 
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likely to consider life and worklife expectancy—both of which could be 
determined by reference to nonblended statistical tables.350 In Baker v. John 
Morrell & Co., the court noted that the plaintiff “assumed she would work 
until age sixty-five.”351 At the time, the plaintiff was forty-four.352 The court 
took judicial notice that the current life expectancy of a woman is 79.5 years, 
citing to the U.S. Life Tables when referring to Baker’s life expectancy.353
Although the female plaintiff was the one who asked the court to take judicial 
notice of her life expectancy, this consideration by the court has implications 
for courts’ views on these tables in other cases or other areas of law as well. 
Interestingly, the court in Baker characterized the plaintiff’s life expectancy as 
“a neutral consideration in the determination of the front pay award.”354
Admittedly, the effect of these tables in the Title VII context often may be 
quite limited, because a central part of front-pay damage doctrine requires the 
mitigation of damages—requiring the court to cut off the damage award after 
the period of time that the plaintiff should have been able to find comparable 
work.355 Moreover, courts also use other data points related to worklife 
expectancy, including mandatory retirement ages or plaintiff testimony 
regarding anticipated retirement.356 Nonetheless, however small the actual 
impact of these tables are in employment discrimination cases, their very use 
                                                                                                                     
plaintiffs generally have an established income such that wage tables are not necessary. 
See, e.g., Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 90 (3d Cir. 2009).
350 See, e.g., Donlin, 581 F.3d at 87 (describing the factors); Baker v. John Morrell & 
Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1178 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (“The court finds that the fifth factor—
Baker’s life and work expectancy—are neutral considerations in the front pay analysis.”
(citation omitted)), aff’d, 382 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2004).
351 Baker, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
352 Id. at 1176.
353 Id. at 1178. 
354 Id. 
355 E.g., Gilster v. Primebank, 884 F. Supp. 2d 811, 856, 859 (N.D. Iowa 2012)
(finding that the plaintiff’s additional life expectancy was 49.8 years, but limiting front-pay 
damages to five years because the period would be “sufficient for Gilster to gain the 
qualifications necessary to become competitive in a different field and to complete her 
education”), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 747 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2014); see also 
Dollar v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (“[A]n
award of front pay until retirement ignores the plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages and the 
district court’s corresponding obligation to estimate the financial impact of future 
mitigation.” (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Champion Int’l Corp., 81 F.3d 
798, 805 (8th Cir. 1996))), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 710 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2013);
Baker, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 1184–85 (reducing the plaintiff’s front-pay to three years, even 
though her remaining life expectancy was over twenty years).
356 E.g., Gotthardt v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(upholding the front-pay award until the plaintiff’s mandatory retirement age of seventy);
Warren v. Cty. Comm’n, 826 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1313–16 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (awarding 
front-pay until the plaintiff’s assumed mandatory retirement age of sixty-five); Baker, 263 
F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1178 (accepting the plaintiff’s testimony that “she would work until age 
sixty-five” as evidence of her worklife expectancy).
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is jarring even on a symbolic sphere, in light of the statute’s attempt to reduce 
discrimination based on race and gender. 
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) uses remedies authorized by 
Title VII.357 Thus, for example, in Colwell v. Suffolk County Police 
Department, three police officers brought a suit against the police department, 
alleging that they were denied promotion as a result of their physical 
disabilities, in violation of the ADA.358 The court defined the plaintiffs’
remaining life and worklife years in reference to the New York Pattern Jury 
Instructions Table 1, which provides life expectancy values for males (albeit 
without reference to race).359 In Tobin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., a 
plaintiff received a damage award that included additional pension benefits 
due to the employer’s failure to accommodate his bipolar condition.360 When 
challenged, the court upheld the jury’s award despite the fact that it predicted 
the defendant would outlive statistical expectations.361 Despite the proven (and 
frankly obvious) discriminatory effect of nonblended tables, in absence of a 
clear legal directive otherwise, courts have used and will continue to use 
nonblended tables in awarding damages for discrimination under the ADA.362
                                                                                                                     
357 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2012).
358 Colwell v. Suffolk Cty. Police Dep’t, 967 F. Supp. 1419, 1422 (E.D.N.Y. 
1997), rev’d, 158 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 1998).
359 Id. at 1435 n.14. “Based on the life expectancy table utilized by the [c]ourt, the jury 
was told that the life expectancy for a 52 year-old male is 76.7 years, for a 48 year-old 
male is 76.1 years, and for a 47 year-old male is 75.9 years.” Id. “The jury was told that, 
according to the same table, a 52 year-old has 10.8 more active years in the labor force, a 
48 year-old has 13.9 more years, and a 47 year-old has more [sic] 14.7 years.” Id. at 1435 
n.15.
360 Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 01-11979 DPW, 2007 WL 967860, at *10 (D. 
Mass. Mar. 29, 2007), aff’d and remanded, 553 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009).
361 Id. at *1, *10. In Tobin, the trial court “took judicial notice of the life expectancy 
charts provided by the Plaintiff and instructed the jury that a white 60 year old male is 
expected to live for another 20.3 years.” Id. at *10. The jury determined that the defendant
would live 7.5 years longer than the chart’s prediction. See id. The court upheld the jury’s 
award, finding that “[l]ife expectancy is inherently speculative, and jurors are not bound by 
actuarial tables, which do not provide evidence of how long any particular individual will 
live.” Id. (citation omitted).
362 See, e.g., Hillmann v. City of Chicago, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1177 (N.D. Ill. 2014) 
(acknowledging that the expert witness’s analysis “did not consider Plaintiff’s health 
condition or specific life expectancy, only the statistical average life expectancy for a man
Plaintiff’s age” (emphasis added)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 834 F.3d 787 
(7th Cir. 2016), cert denied, No. 16-903, 2017 WL 236881 (S. Ct. May 15, 2017) (mem.);
Rutledge v. United States, No. 06-00008, 2008 WL 3914965, at *11 (D. Guam Aug. 21, 
2008) (accepting the testimony of the United States’ economic expert, which in turn relied 
on the U.S. Life Tables of 2003, which includes tables delineating on both race and gender 
lines), aff’d, 417 F.App’x 635 (9th Cir. 2011). But see Webner v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 101 
F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1237 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (finding the plaintiff’s work and life expectancy 
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C. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act 
Another important federal compensatory framework is found in the 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.363 This law allows those 
injured or killed by certain vaccines to claim compensation outside the 
traditional tort system, while reducing the liability, insurance, and litigation 
costs of vaccine manufacturers.364
Recall that future loss of earnings calculations require knowledge not only 
of the average wage but also of worklife statistics.365 One of the most 
interesting cases is Childers v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,366
which is notable for its reasoning on the issue of worklife expectancy.367 In 
Childers, the petitioner’s expert presented gender-blended worklife expectancy 
data and the respondent’s expert presented gender-differentiated worklife 
expectancy data.368 Conflicting precedents were found for the use of gender-
based worklife expectancies of female children.369 The court ultimately 
rejected gender-based worklife expectancy, stating: 
Does it follow that because some women have historically been able to spend 
years out of the workforce, female children in the Program should always get 
substantially smaller awards for “lost earnings” than male children? I do not 
think so. Rather, I note that nowhere in the statutory formula of 300aa–
15(a)(3)(B) is there any express, or even implied, distinction between males 
and females. Indeed, the formula mandates, as discussed above, that the basic 
earnings figure be determined by averaging the earnings of all workers, even 
though historically female workers have earned somewhat less than male 
workers. Therefore, just as we do not under the formula use different average 
                                                                                                                     
were factors in the calculation of front-pay awards; however, given a lack of testimony 
“regarding the significance of [these factors] to [the plaintiff’s] ability to secure 
comparable employment,” the court refused to speculate on such significance, and 
disregarded these factors), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remaded, 267 F.3d 828 (8th Cir. 
2001).
363 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2012). Section 300aa-15(3)(A) provides
compensation for “actual and anticipated loss of earnings” for those injured after the age of 
eighteen. Section 300aa-15(3)(B) provides the compensatory framework for “loss of 
earnings” for those injured before eighteen and likely to “suffer impaired earning 
capacity.”
364 See Schaefer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 1994). 
365 See supra Part II. 
366 Childers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 96-194V, 1999 WL 218893 (Fed. 
Cl. Mar. 26, 1999).
367 See id. at *16–18.
368 Id. at *16. 
369 Id. at *17. 
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earnings figures for males and females, I see no good reason to use different 
work-life expectancy figures based upon gender.370
Childers’s express rejection of gender-differentiated worklife expectancy 
seems to be an exception to the rule among the cases that addressed worklife 
expectancy, despite the special master’s finding of conflicting precedent.371
In contrast, Edgar ex rel. Edgar v. Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services was a case involving a female petitioner injured before 
the age of eighteen.372 The victim’s total worklife earnings were based on the 
estimated worklife of a high school-educated female, despite the petitioner’s
projection of a total worklife of the median of historical male and female 
worklife for college-educated persons.373 Indeed, more generally, our 
investigation reveals that regarding life or worklife expectancies, special 
masters in the sample more frequently used gender- and race-based 
statistics.374 Four out of nine cases that provide life or worklife expectancy 
                                                                                                                     
370 Id. Special Master Hastings continues his reasoning in the accompanying footnote 
and draws parallels between his result and cases not involving Vaccine Injury Program 
claims that have “found it to be inappropriate to construct ‘lost earnings’ awards differently 
for men and women based upon gender.” Id. at *17 n.20. Specially, Special Master 
Hastings acknowledged Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d 366, 371 (1st Cir. 1976), and 
Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 997 (D.R.I. 1987), two instances where courts
declined to distinguish between gender in determining lost earnings awards.
371 Childers, 1999 WL 218893, at *17.
372 Edgar ex rel. Edgar v. Sec’y of the Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 286, 
287–88 (Cl. Ct. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 989 F.2d 473 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
373 See id. at 291–93. Although an exact match in BLS statistics for an estimated 
worklife of twenty-nine years was not found, there were very similar figures in Tables A-5, 
which is gender- and race-based, and A-6, which is gender-based. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, supra note 50, at 19 tbl.A-5, 20 tbl.A-6.
374 There were nine cases in the sample that discussed life expectancy figures. See 
Childers, 1999 WL 218893, at *16–18 (rejecting worklife expectancy based solely on 
experience of women in favor of an average worklife for persons of both genders); Edgar,
26 Cl. Ct. at 291–93 (reviewing the special master’s consideration of various worklife 
earnings projections based on gender and educational level); Sheehan v. Sec’y of the Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., 19 Cl. Ct. 320, 322 (Cl. Ct. 1990) (assuming the petitioner had 
“at least twenty more years work,” without citation); Hanagan ex rel. Hanagan v. Sec’y of 
the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 19 Cl. Ct. 7, 16 (Cl. Ct. 1989) (stating the male 
petitioner’s assumed average life expectancy without specifying gender or race); First 
Commercial Bank v. Sec’y of the Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 89-14-V, 1989 WL 
250131, at *15 (Cl. Ct. Oct. 30, 1989) (recommending a finding of at least twenty-seven 
years’ productive work if not for injury, without citation); Shaw v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 89-7-V, 1989 WL 250126, at *8 (Cl. Ct. Sept. 22, 1989) (“At 
age 18, the average worklife expectancy of a white male is 39.4 years.” (citing BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 50, at 13 tbl. A-2)); Strother v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., No. 88-32V, 1989 WL 250120, at *11 (Cl. Ct. Sept. 18, 1989)
(projecting worklife expectancy based on race- and gender-differentiated Table A-2 from 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 50); Schroeder ex rel. Meland v. Sec’y of the 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 88-22V, 1989 WL 250110, at *12 (Cl. Ct. Aug. 29, 
1989) (using expert testimony to determine life expectancy, but not citing any particular 
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figures cited, or were traceable to, the BLS’s Worklife Estimates: Effects of 
Race and Education (February 1986), which differentiates on the basis of race 
and gender.375
VI. THE SOLUTION
We have argued that using race- and gender-based tables is unjust and 
inefficient because it has the devastating effect of perpetuating 
discrimination—by both providing inaccurate discriminatory damage awards 
and creating perverse ex ante incentives for potential tortfeasors. In this Part,
we will sketch out what we consider to be the preferable alternative. 
One simple solution in the case of wrongful death—supported by Ariel 
Porat—is to award damages that are not dependent on the victim’s income.376
Accordingly, killing a Wall Street lawyer or a homeless person would have the 
same monetary consequence. The tortfeasors would pay the same amount of 
damages to all victims.377 The amount would reflect the value society places 
on people’s lives, period.378 By extension, when the victim does not die but is 
only injured, damages should be based on the injury itself and not depend on 
the income of the victim. Thus, damages can equal some multiplier of the 
medical costs to reflect the fact that bodily injury victims suffer correlated 
monetary and nonmonetary losses beyond their medical costs.379
While such an approach yields various benefits, including lower litigation 
costs and the fact that it eliminates the ex ante incentives to target the 
disadvantaged, it is unlikely to be adopted by courts any time soon, as it 
contradicts centuries of common law precedents. Nor is it likely to be adopted 
by legislatures, at least in the United States, although similar conceptions are 
often employed in mass disasters when victim compensation funds are created. 
                                                                                                                     
source of data). In Euken ex rel. Euken v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human 
Services, No. 91-1059V, 1992 WL 132548, at *7 (Cl. Ct. May 28, 1992), rev’d, 34 F.3d 
1045 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the special master referenced BLS figures as the basis for a 39.4 
years worklife expectancy, but did not name a specific publication or table. However, the 
BLS gives a figure of 39.4 years for expected active life for seventeen-year-old white men 
in Table A-2, and none of its other worklife expectancies in Table A-1 or Table A-3 is a 
match. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 50, at 9 tbl.A-1, 13 tbl.A-2, 14 tbl.A-
3.
375 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 50, at 13 tbl.A-2. Four cases determined 
life or worklife expectancy but did not provide adequate information to find any particular 
statistical source for the special master’s assumptions or the expert’s testimonies. Euken,
1992 WL 132548, at *7; Sheehan, 19 Cl. Ct. at 322; First Commercial Bank, 1989 WL 
250131, at *15; Schroeder, 1989 WL 250110, at *12. 
376 See Porat, supra note 204, at 102.
377 See id. at 101–02.
378 See id. at 97–107. It is not clear whether Porat holds the same views on killing the 
old versus killing the young—that is, whether their lives should be evaluated as equal.
379 See Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique 
of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
87, 110–15 (2006).
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Therefore, in this Article, we defend the simplest possible practical 
solution: courts should adopt one blended worklife table, one blended life 
expectancy table, and one blended wage table for use in damage calculations 
in tort cases. It is a solution that can be implemented immediately by any court 
in the country. 
Specifically, calculating damages for future pain and suffering requires 
that the plaintiff’s pain and suffering be established, as well as her expected 
longevity. As for the first component, courts can continue estimating pain and 
suffering in the same way they have been doing it so far.380 To the extent that 
any changes are required, they are beyond the scope of this Article.381 As for 
the second component, our proposal is to use blended life-expectancy statistics 
rather than a gender- and race-based table. Next, calculating damages for 
future medical costs requires the plaintiff’s medical expenses, as well as
expected longevity, to be established. Under our proposal, for the first 
component, courts would still require expert testimony to establish the 
plaintiff’s annual medical expenses.382 For the second component, however, 
courts would use a race-blind, nongendered life expectancy statistic and
eliminate the bias from the calculation.383
                                                                                                                     
380 See id. at 111.
381 Many problems exist in the way courts estimate pain and suffering. See id. at 93–
97. However, that discussion is well beyond the scope of this Article.
382 An open question remains regarding the current practice of courts’ adjusting the life 
expectancy statistic based on the particular health characteristics or habits of the plaintiff 
(e.g., she suffers from heart disease, everyone in her family lives until age ninety, etc.). 
383 Studies have demonstrated that, controlling for socioeconomic factors, the life 
expectancy differences between races are seriously minimized or disappear. See Hilary 
Waldron, Mortality Differentials by Race (Office of Policy, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., 
Working Paper No. 99, 2002), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/workingpapers/wp99.html
[https://perma.cc/F8ZE-FZET]; see also Morgan Kelly, Study Reveals Impact of 
Socioeconomic Factors on the Racial Gap in Life Expectancy, PRINCETON U. (Apr. 4, 
2012), http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S33/35/55M88/ [https://perma.cc/WG
F4-HU4W] (finding that socioeconomic differences account for 70%–80% of the life 
expectancy divide between blacks and whites). In reality, it is entirely appropriate that 
race-neutral life expectancy be used as a basis for future medical expenses. Reasons for the 
life expectancy divide between genders are less clear, and may include genetic factors, 
social choices (including building a strong support network), and employment status. Id. 
Certainly, some may argue that if the differential is due to positive choices made by 
women, women should benefit from a higher life expectancy prediction. See id. However, 
given the difficulty in disentangling competing genetic, social, and employment factors 
influencing female life expectancy, we argue that it is most appropriate to defer to blended 
gender tables. Additionally, as discussed by Cary Franklin in other contexts, courts are 
skeptical about attempts to defend discriminatory laws by arguing that the laws benefit 
women, since women’s rights litigators in the 1970s pushed for total gender equality by 
convincing courts that laws that seem to benefit women are more often part of a broader 
framework that disadvantages women on the whole. See generally Cary Franklin, The Anti-
Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 
(2010) (discussing the litigation strategy of the 1970s and its implications for the modern 
court).
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Lastly, calculating damages for future loss of income requires establishing 
future wages as well as expected working years. We offer two propositions in 
this regard. First, when calculating the future wages of plaintiffs, courts should 
not require expert testimony to determine plaintiffs’ future income. Instead, 
they should use the average national wage, absent any account for race or 
gender. Our suggestion deviates from that put forward by Chamallas and 
Wriggins to use white males’ tables for everyone, on the basis that their 
proposal will lead to over-deterrence, which will unnecessarily increase 
liability costs, potentially making products and services more expensive.384
Second, for the expected worklife calculations, courts should use blended 
statistical worklife tables. The outcome would be a nondiscriminatory and 
unbiased damage award.385
While adoption of these proposals would certainly bring those 
disadvantaged by race or gender in the current system to a more equal level, it 
would reduce the damages for those who are currently advantaged in the 
system because of their race or gender. The solution, however, is simple: 
advantaged people who are worried that the average income will not fully 
cover their losses in the case of an injury should purchase first-party (private 
or public) insurance. Similarly, those worried that they might live longer or 
work more years than average, and therefore might not receive sufficient 
damages for future harm, should also purchase insurance. 
Law and economics scholars might be concerned that using blended tables 
could create a moral hazard problem whereby victims’ incentives to take 
precautions are distorted; the more one is compensated, the less care one will 
take. However, such a worry is unfounded. First, moral hazard is much less 
likely to arise in the case of bodily injury accidents than for property losses. 
Whereas there may be some people who might prefer to be severely disabled 
for the rest of their lives as long as they are guaranteed a stable income, most 
people would not risk their lives in such a way. Second, and more importantly, 
our argument here is most persuasive when applied to children. Thus, to the 
extent that children are the focus of such a policy change, it is extremely 
implausible to expect children to behave in such a morally hazardous way.
                                                                                                                     
384 See Chamallas, supra note 106, at 1445; Wriggins, supra note 105, at 272–73. 
385 Some questions remain about whether we should adjust the loss of income up or 
down based on personal merits particularized to the plaintiff. While the concept seems 
appealing in theory (and more closely aligned with the “make whole” goal of tort law), 
such an attempt poses some problems in application. First, it may assume away the 
possibility of career change for adult plaintiffs. If we adjust down based on a plaintiff’s
occupation as a janitor, we assume that he would never have moved into a more lucrative 
career. However, if we allow claims that plaintiffs intended to change careers, this may 
inappropriately incentivize strategic behavior and encourage plaintiffs to falsely argue that 
they planned to take this course of action. Second, such a practice allows for back-end 
discrimination based on family demographics. Allowing for adjustment may leave room 
for defendants to argue that family dynamics and parental decisions correlate with the 
plaintiff’s income. Doing so would replicate the existing socioeconomic gap in damage 
awards, but through the lens of family background.
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Indeed, the tort system can be conceptualized as a system of insurance 
prefactored into the costs of goods and services.386 Therefore, there is 
something intuitive about making the system an egalitarian one—providing 
basic identical coverage—and having those dissatisfied by their potential lot 
purchase additional insurance to meet their individual needs.387
Once we conceptualize tort damage awards as a form of insurance, the 
proposal becomes more in line with current trends.388 Many state legislatures 
have codified statutes that expressly permit the use of gender-neutral blended 
tables in life insurance policies (although, admittedly, most do not preclude the 
use of gender-based tables as an alternative).389 Similarly, many states prohibit 
gender discrimination and most prohibit race discrimination in disability 
insurance.390 Obamacare prohibits both gender and race discrimination in 
health insurance.391
Our proposal can be compared to an approach set forth by the Israeli 
Supreme Court, which is among the most progressive supreme courts in the 
world in this context.392 First, whereas our analysis so far has been most 
persuasive when applied to children, nothing in the logic of our analysis 
prevents courts from applying it to all plaintiffs without established earnings 
records, regardless of their age. By contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court, which 
requires the use of the national average wage for the calculation of damages, 
irrespective of race, gender, origin, or religion, limits its holding to minors and 
young adults without established earnings records.393 Because the bulk of 
personal injury plaintiffs will be adults—many (especially women) without 
established earning records—limiting equality to minors will have a smaller 
effect on the system as a whole.394 And yet, proposing to apply blended tables 
to adults as well will require a much greater deviation from the current regime. 
Since our intention is to first convince courts to start using blended tables for 
children, we leave the potentially more complicated case of adults open for 
further consideration. A second point of comparison between our approach 
and that of the Israeli Supreme Court is that we propose to apply the national 
average wage without exception.395 In contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court uses 
                                                                                                                     
386 See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort 
Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1569–70 (1997).
387 See id. 
388 This understanding of tort law is well-established. See, e.g., id. at. 1569 n.9 (listing 
economic scholars’ discussions of tort law as an insurance theory).
389 Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 195, 246–50 (2014).
390 See id. at 232–52.
391 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012).
392 CA 100064/02 Migdal Ins. Co. v. Abu-Hana (3) TakSC 3932 (2005) (Isr.).
393 Id.
394 See id. 
395 Cf. Sherri R. Lamb, Toward Gender-Neutral Data for Adjudicating Lost Future 
Earning Damages: An Evidentiary Perspective, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 299, 338 (1996)
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the average income in society as a presumption, but then allows the parties to 
argue for deviations upward or downward if they believe they can prove that 
the earning capacity would have been higher or lower than the national 
average because of qualifications, educational attainment, or aspirations for 
future success.396 However, the ex ante benefits of allowing for such 
deviations are nil, and again we argue that a better way to address this problem 
within tort law is to allow concerned individuals to purchase insurance.
Third, while the Israeli Supreme Court’s approach uses an identical 
retirement age for men and women (even though in practice men and women 
may retire at different ages), it does not use identical life expectancy tables for 
men and women.397 We suggest using identical life expectancy tables. 
Observe that, unlike the cases of wage tables and worklife tables, using 
blended life expectancy tables hurts women, as women’s life expectancy is 
generally higher. Our approach of using blended life expectancy tables stems
from our belief that tort law should not create targeting incentives aimed at 
any race or gender, no matter who the targeted group is.398
A defendant forced to compensate a plaintiff according to blended tables 
would likely raise an obvious criticism of our proposal: why should the 
defendant have to pay the bill for the proposed discrimination “fix”? After all, 
a defendant may argue, discrimination is a societal problem and, as such, 
should burden everyone equally. Accordingly, a just solution could be to have 
the defendant pay the exact damages using nonblended tables, and victims 
from disadvantaged groups could be rewarded the difference from the 
government via the tax and transfer system.399 This way, the burden would be 
shared across society rather than being placed with the defendant to shoulder 
the blame for a societal problem. However, this fix does nothing to address the 
fact that our courts would continue to perpetuate discriminatory practices—
                                                                                                                     
(suggesting to “consider each person as equivalent to the average, unless evidence is 
produced which removes the plaintiff from the normal range”).
396 Migdal Ins. Co. (3) TakSC 3932. Judge Weinstein, though not discussing the option 
at length, highlights the possible use of a national average unless evidence is produced to 
remove the plaintiff from the range as consistent with his general conclusion that tort law 
should be an individualized assessment based on individual characteristics. See G.M.M. ex 
rel. Hernandez–Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 153–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
397 Migdal Ins. Co. (3) TakSC 3932.
398 In a recent case by the Court of Justice of the European Union, it was determined 
that men and women should be priced the same even though their risk is different. Case C-
236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL v. Conseil des 
ministres, 2011 E.C.R. I-800, at I-805. A similar approach was taken by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the landmark cases of Norris and Manhart mentioned earlier. See supra notes 
343–47 and accompanying text.
399 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 667 (noting that criticisms of 
economic analysis and its focus on efficiency rather than normative factors “would be moot 
if the income tax system—understood here to include possible transfer payments to the 
poor—could be used freely to achieve any desired distribution of income”).
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practices that inspire revulsion in other institutions. More importantly, such an 
approach would maintain the ex ante incentives to target the disadvantaged.400
And yet a tweak to the proposed rule could ostensibly rectify this problem: 
the defendants would pay in courts according to blended tables and then 
receive a tax credit for the difference. This solution, although successful in 
spreading costs and protecting the image of courts, is deficient on another 
ground. Defendants receiving tax credits would have a continued incentive to 
base their liability on nonblended characteristics. Hence, under this alternative, 
society would still subsidize targeting. 
Another argument defendants may raise relates to Title VII, which 
prohibits discrimination in the workplace only among employers with fifteen
or more employees.401 This cutoff reflects a societal judgment that small 
employers should not bear the costs of antidiscrimination norms.402
Accordingly, only tort defendants who are large corporations should be held 
liable, using blended tables, whereas smaller tort defendants should be subject 
to nonblended tables. The response to this argument might be that society 
should instead take inspiration from the Fair Housing Act (FHA) that forbids 
everyone, big or small, from discriminating in housing (with limited 
exemptions for certain single-family homes and owner-occupied dwellings).403
Clearly, society is willing to put the burden of compliance on both large and 
small property owners through the FHA to combat discrimination in the 
housing market. Accordingly, at least some societal indication exists that tort 
defendants of all sizes should sometimes pay based on blended tables.
VII. CONCLUSION
A 2003 review of the available and relevant empirical data suggested that 
courts reproduce the economic inequalities associated with race and gender in 
tort damage awards.404 These differences were commonly attributed to judges’
                                                                                                                     
400 See supra Part I.
401 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
402 Jacqueline Louise Williams, Note, The Flimsy Yardstick: How Many Employees 
Does It Take to Defeat a Title VII Discrimination Claim?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 221, 233 
(1996) (“One of the principal objections was that the employer-employee relationship in a 
small business is a personal one . . . .” (citing 110 CONG. REC. 13085 (1964) (remarks of 
Sen. Cotton))).
403 42 U.S.C. § 3603.
404 EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF JURY AWARDS 54–58 (2003). An earlier study conducted by the Rand Corporation in 
1985 concerning 9,000 civil jury trials in Cook County between 1959 and 1979 found that 
blacks received smaller awards, about three-quarters of those pertaining to an equivalent 
white. AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS 
IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS, at v, viii (1985). However, the data on the effect of a 
plaintiff’s race on jury awards are extremely limited and, on closer inspection, suggest 
mixed results. GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra, at 54–55. The findings from one study on this 
topic (a simulated civil rape case) were mixed, with college students awarding higher 
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and jurors’ bigoted perceptions.405 In this Article, we showed that the blame 
might (also) lie with the core “neutral” practice of awarding damages by using 
government race- and gender-based statistical tables.406 We argued that 
current practice in the awarding of damages in courts is not only unfair but 
also inefficient and therefore should be abolished. We started by examining 
the current approaches for determining tort damages. These approaches 
include courts’ use of life expectancy, worklife expectancy, and average wage 
statistical tables. As we have noted, many of these tables provide granular data 
delineated by both gender and race. The scholarly response to the use of these 
tables and resulting discrimination has been focused mainly on average wage 
tables, largely ignoring discrimination arising from both life expectancy and 
worklife expectancy tables. This lack of attention continues to perpetuate in 
most tort case law books, indoctrinating the next generation of lawyers with 
the perception that questions of discrimination are not central to tort law. 
Next, we moved on to an examination of the various theories pertaining to 
tort law: corrective justice, distributive justice, and efficiency. We 
demonstrated how the use of blended tables was not detrimental to tort 
theorists’ approach. 
We focused mainly on analyzing the problem from an efficiency 
perspective. In this regard, the analysis is gloomier. The conventional wisdom 
purports that efficiency calls for the use of nonblended tables and views 
targeting the disadvantaged as an efficient result. We have showed that 
adherence to maximizing social welfare not only tolerates the use of 
nonblended tables but actually demands it. The practical success of such an 
attempt remains to be determined. 
Finally, we exposed and examined the ironic—and in our view, 
unacceptable—usage of nonblended tables in federal laws, including laws 
whose sole purpose is to fight discrimination. 
Several principled questions remain open. Can the arguments presented in 
this Article be expanded beyond race and gender? For example, there are 
separate tables that adjust average life expectancy for disability, including 
tables for those suffering from quadriplegia.407 The use of these tables means 
that the more severely injured the plaintiff is, the greater a “discount” the 
defendant receives for the harm she has caused, which is problematic in terms 
                                                                                                                     
damages to the white plaintiff and jury-eligible adults awarding higher damages to the 
black plaintiff. Id. The authors did not find any significant empirical support for possible 
reasons as to the difference in damage awards by plaintiff’s race. Id. More data is available 
on the effect of plaintiffs’ gender; this data suggests that men fare better than women in 
courts of law. See id. at 55–58. Archival datasets from the Jury Verdict Research 
Corporation and the Washington State Task Force on Economic Consequences of Gender 
in Civil Litigation were reported with more granularity and showed male plaintiffs 
receiving higher damage awards than female plaintiffs. See id. at 55–56. 
405 See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 404, at 54–58.
406 See Chamallas, supra note 115, at 467.
407 McMillian v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 248 (E.D.N.Y 2008).
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of overall fairness but also in terms of incentives.408 A related question 
involves the extent to which the arguments presented in this Article can be 
applied to plaintiffs of all ages. As we saw, the Israeli Supreme Court limits its 
protection of disadvantaged groups to minors and young adults who have not 
yet established earning records. It is easier to assimilate the idea that children 
of all genders and races should receive the same damages for the same injury 
than it is to digest this notion for adults. The arguments and logic presented 
here, however, suggest similar conclusions for adults as well. 
Another interesting question relates to the use of nonblended tables when 
such usage helps minorities. Judge Weinstein seems to think that such usage is 
legitimate on affirmative action grounds.409
Lastly, perhaps the most important question left involves the extent to 
which the practice of using nonblended tables is not only unfair and 
inefficient, but also unconstitutional. Despite some—regrettably largely 
ignored—assertions that this practice is indeed unconstitutional, the question is 
not at all simple, and therefore is discussed elsewhere.410
For now, the most pressing issue is this: courts should stop using 
nonblended tables—with immediate effect.
                                                                                                                     
408 See Chamallas, supra note 106, at 1441.
409 See McMillian, 253 F.R.D. at 255–56.
410 See generally Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A 
Constitutional Challenge to the Use of Race-Based Tables in Calculating Tort Damages,
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with the authors). Martha Chamallas and 
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